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Allocation Of Jurisdiction On Patent Disputes In The Models Developed By The
Hague Conference In Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries And The
Relationship Of Private Parties
By
Mariano Municoy*
© 2005, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
Introduction:
It is well known that the current globalization of markets has expanded the use
and demand of innovative activity protected through patent rights beyond
domestic borders. This paper will address the question of how disputes over
patent rights involving parties from different countries could be internationally
regulated.
The main object of my analysis will concentrate on the models developed by the
Hague Conference in private international law which so far have brought about
two major projects of proposed regulation. The first, which here will be called the
1999 Draft, is a model of multilateral treaty that could allow a domestic court to
adjudicate disputes concerning foreign patents regardless of any relation
between the parties prior to the dispute. The second, called the 2003 Proposal, is
a model to enforce exclusive choice of forum clauses included in business-tobusiness contracts so that a court selected in such a contract may adjudicate any
dispute arising therein.
The main questions to be answered here are: a) should patent disputes be
included in such proposals? b) If in the affirmative, whether or not both models
are appropriate to deal with the existing asymmetries among countries within the
current international patent system; c) entering into the specific issue of this
paper, which is the allocation of jurisdiction between member states, the last
question to address is whether a court other than one from the registering state
should have jurisdiction over infringement and/or validity of action given the
current principle of independence of patents.
The major conclusions are: i) that under the current international patent system
there are some benefits to gain from global litigation of patents. However, that
system is not developed enough as to generally allow any country to adjudicate a
dispute involving foreign rights regardless of the relation of the parties. Such a
system was proposed in the 1999 Draft and provoked much disagreement
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among member countries, particularly about eroding the exclusive jurisdiction of
a court from the registering state.
ii) although there are many details to take into account, I shall state that the main
problem with such a general system is the existence of member countries with
not only different but also opposite incentives to regulate their domestic patent
systems taking into account their particular positions within the global market.
These different incentives have not become a broad strategy of discrimination
between domestic and foreign patent holders in domestic disputes due to the
principle of national treatment instrumented in the main treaties covering the
regulation of industrial property, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property of 18831 and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 2 .
However, in general terms there have been two major and opposite ways of
regulating domestic patent rights: some countries set high levels of patent
protection while others set low ones. This last choice of setting low patent
protection has been constrained by international treaties but the gap is likely to
remain. Indeed, these different structural incentives, based not only on selfinterested economic strategies of development but also on different cultural
traditions, have increased the transaction cost for private parties to engage in
commercial transactions and in producing innovative activity. Likewise they have
been a problem for lawmakers trying to develop a mechanism capable of
diminishing the use of judicial resources when dealing with international litigation
of intellectual property rights: the case when single inventions with parallel patent
rights are commercially exploited and infringed in multiple countries. Because
most of the literature addressing the convenience of including patent rights within
the work of the Hague Conference has been concerned with the dynamic
relations between developed countries 3 with symmetric incentives; I will use
some examples from Latin-American countries in order to illustrate the different
issues arising from patent disputes involving parties from a net exporter and from
a net importer country of patentable goods, or countries with asymmetric
incentives to regulate and adjudicate disputes involving said assets.4
iii) focusing on the asymmetric incentives between those sort of countries, I shall
conclude that the models shaped by the Hague Conference should be perfected
to align those asymmetric domestic incentives for the benefit of private parties,

1 Hereinafter "Paris Convention".
2

Hereinafter "TRIPs".

3 Hereinafter

"DCs" or countries with symmetric incentives to regulate patent rights and adjudicate

disputes involving said rights.
4 Hereinafter I shall refer to intangible assets although this paper is particularly focused
on those
assets that can be protected by patents. Moreover I will assume that developing and less
developed countries, hereinafter altogether called "LDCs", are net importer countries of said
assets unless stated otherwise.

governments as well as indirectly for consumers of goods involved in those
disputes.
iv) last but not least, the ultimate aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that
the 2003 Proposal not only may overcome most of those problems but may also
help to develop a more efficient and fairer international patent system.
In order to do so, I consider it necessary to give a brief overview of some related
issues before.
Index:
In Section 1, I shall offer an overview of the current international patent system
and then I shall set forth a stated correlation between the paths of increasing
international substantive harmonization of patent rights with that of decreasing
costs to enforce those rights across domestic borders.
In Section 2, I shall briefly describe the two major current systems dealing with
international litigation of patent rights, the European Union ("the EU") and the
United States (" the U.S.")
In Section 3, I shall point out the general benefits and costs of having an
international system to enforce patent rights.
In Section 4, I am going to briefly describe and analyze the preliminary proposals
and ongoing projects developed by the Hague Conference.
In Section 5, I shall offer a normative rationale to deal with the emerging issue of
international litigation and enforcement of patents. Basically, I will distinguish
between disputes involving related and unrelated parties as well as between
whether the countries of those parties have symmetric or asymmetric incentives,
which depends mostly on whether they are net exporters or importers of
intangible assets.
Finally, I shall apply that rationale to the current discussion about international
litigation of patents, pointing out some conclusions.

SECTION 1): CORRELATION BETWEEN FURTHER HARMONIZATION OF
DOMESTIC LEGAL PATENT SYSTEMS AND DIMINISHING COSTS TO
ENFORCE PATENTS GLOBALLY: THE NETWORK OF BILATERAL,
REGIONAL AND PLURILATERAL AGREEMENTS.
The issue of cross border enforcement of patent rights, or international litigation
of patents, is embedded in the most general process of international
harmonization of intellectual property rights, which in turn has been influenced by
the international policy favoring low-barrier-to-trade among nations, hereinafter
globalization.

Because of this relation with international policy, economics and (geo) politics,
international litigation of patents is an issue emerging from the interaction of
those complex factors. Moreover, there are many signals that it will acquire even
more importance than today, as will be pointed out throughout this paper.5
In order to get a better understanding of said correlation, I shall briefly describe
what is called the current "International Patent System".6
1). Description and rationalization of the current stage of the "International
Patent System"
The starting point is the principle of territoriality, which was the source of the
notion of "independency of patent rights" among countries in the first
multinational agreement governing patent rights, The Paris Convention,
according to its article 4bis. Under the understanding of this principle, member
countries agreed to regulate patents, i.e. establish the substantive rights and
obligations derived from a patent right as well as providing the remedies for
infringement of those rights, exclusively according to their own domestic law; but
for some minor exceptions.7 Therefore, countries were more than able to choose
the particular sort of patent system most suitable for their own particular political,
economic and cultural interest. 8
5 The importance of this topic can be inferred from the ongoing projects covering international

litigation of intellectual property rights such as projects in The American Law Institute in the U.S.:
Intellectual Property: Principles Governing jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments in
transnational disputes; the Max Planck Institute in the EU: International Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments; as well as those developed by The International
Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Special Committee Q 153, available at
http://www.hcch. net/doc/jdgmpd 14ip. pdf (hereinafter "Committee Q 153").
should be pointed out that this is an "abstract use", as there is not a clear basis to include the

6 It

notion of "system" in the practice of international patents. However, these legal treaties covering
international relations between domestic patent systems and the practice emerging therein
together are to be referred to as "International Patent System".
7 Independence of patents was not an absolute notion. Its core objective was to allow each
country to apply its domestic substantive patent law and procedures without deference to foreign
decisions over related foreign patents. However, there were some limits to that discretion such as
National Treatment (Art. 2) and Priority Rights (art.4) of the Paris Convention.
8 However I will focus on the utilitarian arguments pointing out that information has
some

problems, derived from some characteristics of information that should be taken into account as:
nonappropriability, ("the fact that producers have difficulty selling information for more than a
fraction of its value" ); non-rivalrous, ("... Information contain ideas. One person's use of an idea

does not diminish its availability for others to use"); and non-excludable, ("excluding some people
from learning about a new idea can be expensive because the transmission of ideas is so
cheap"),Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 126, (Addison Wesley Longman edits., Third Edition,
2000). Using a microeconomic reasoning it is asserted that ("an unregulated market will
undersupply creative works that embody ideas... This fact suggests the need for state intervention
in the market for information"), id. Therefore it is very important to highlight the role of the state in
regulating innovative information whatever sort of legal system is to be used under a public
choice constraint: whether by the state directly supplying the required information; by public
subsidies to generate it; or/and by the creation and enforcement of private intellectual property
rights, in this case patent rights. Because of this universal dilemma on producing these sort of
public goods, different domestic legal systems have shaped those rights in different ways based
on historical, cultural and economic factors. All these issues show the relevance of the legal
system in the final result of quality and quantity of innovation production, as ("property rights over
intangible assets only exists to the extent the government creates them"), Margaret M. Blair, Gary
M. Hoffman and Salvatore P. Tambur, Clarifying intellectual property rights for the new economy,
in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS: INVESTING WISELY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Bruce
Berman John Wiley & Sons edits, 2002). Applying this rationale to the international patent legal
system and taking into account the growing importance of intangible goods within international
trade, it should be obvious that each government has an incentive to choose a strategy in their
trade relations with other countries. Basically, the first choice is whether or not to coordinate their
own legal regimens to reach some final result when trading with other countries. Then, depending
on whether a country is net exporter or net importer of intangible assets, I will assume that the
best self-interested choice is to protect local producers in the former group and to free ride on
foreign-developed-technology in the latter. The main point is that without international trade and
the growing availability of information worldwide, each government might be able to decide,
based on its own values, how to solve those dilemmas mentioned above. Because nowadays
promoting international trade seems to be the focal point strategy for most governments, it is
necessary to analyze the incentives that each government has to coordinate its domestic system
within the international system. One of the asymmetric incentives to regulate patent rights
between DCs and LDCs is the scope and extension of the public domain which marks the border
between novel and anticipated inventions. Currently, there are many "public domains", each one
is created and regulated by domestic patent systems although most of them are interconnected
as long as foreign granted and published patents account as prior art in most of these domestic
systems. For example the U.S. considers that most of the activity capable of anticipating
inventions should happen within the borders of the country except for particular cases. This view
can be deemed as protectionist against worldwide activities that should anticipate US inventions,
thus creating a shelter for US filers of patents against foreign activities. On the other hand, most

Moreover, the commitments taken under the Paris Convention were incorporated
through the enactment of domestic legislation. As far as there was no
supranational authority to monitor the compliance with the standards set by that
Convention, domestic legislatures and courts were in charge of shaping the
international patent system. A premise of that system has been that national
courts adjudicate disputes within their domestic boundaries and apply their own
domestic law. 9
When the Paris Convention was the main treaty binding countries on how to
regulate patent rights, there was an implicit understanding that some countries
were net exporters of intangible assets capable of patent protection while others
were net importers. The former were usually DCs while the latter were LDCs.
Moreover, those different countries had asymmetric interests regarding the legal
treatment of patents and other IPRs according to their specific economic
realities1 ° . However, under the umbrella of territoriality those opposite incentives
LDCs may have a rational-self interested basis for choosing an "absolute" standard of novelty
narrowing number of (assumed mostly foreign-owned) patents granted therein, thus extending
the content of "public domain" to be enjoyed by their habitants through the global dissemination of
information.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System", 77
CHI.-KENT L. Rev. 993-1014 (2002). That notion included even those countries most open to
international trade such as the UK, James J. Fawcett and Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property
and Private International Law, 721, (Oxford University Press, 1998)("The impression was created
that each intellectual property right was only dealt with in the country it had been created. That
meant that few attempts were made to have foreign intellectual property related judgments
recognized and enforced in any part of the United Kingdom").
10

Janice M. Mueller, An introduction to Patent Law, 399 (Aspen Publishers, 2003) ("By the late

1800s, national governments and economists determined that these differences between national
patent systems could be used as tools to manipulate national wealth. More specifically, they
realized that granting patents to foreign nationals generally resulted in a net outflow of national
wealth").

to regulate patent rights were tolerated11 until major concerns started to come up
within discussions such as the level of piracy in LDCs affecting companies of
DCs and the path for developing countries to grow economically that usually
included the issue of transfer of technology. 12
Despite its hallmark role, territoriality has been affected by many of those
economic, political and cultural factors pushing towards globalization.13 As a
11 Ralph H. Folsom, Michel Wallace Gordon and John A. Spanogle, Jr., International Business
Transactions a problem oriented coursebook, 730, (West publishing Co., Third Edition, 1995)
["Issues surrounding the transfer of knowledge across national borders have provoked intense
discussions during the last three decades... At the core is the desire of third world countries (often
advanced developing countries like Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) to obtain
protected information quickly and affordably irrespective of the proprietary rights and profits
motives of current holders (usually persons from the most developed countries). Developing
countries want production processes which maximize uses of abundant, inexpensive labor but
which result in products that are competitive in the international marketplace; capital intensive
production processes (e.g., robot production of automobiles) may be of less interest. MNEs may
be willing to share (by way of license or sale) a good deal of proprietary information, but are
reluctant to part with their "core technology"....The very sharing of intellectual property rights
across borders raises a risk that proprietary control of the technology may be lost or, at a
minimum, that a competitor will be created. For those reasons, international licensing agreements
are complex legal documents that need to be carefully negotiated and drafted. Absent licensed
transfers, piracy of intellectual proprietary is increasingly commonplace. Indeed, in some
developing countries such theft has risen to the height of development strategy"]. The major
binding principle was National Treatment of foreign owners that could not be discriminated vis-avis domestic patent holders.
12

Ralph H. Folsom and others, supra, note 11, ("The developing nations, the industrialized

nations, and the nonmarket economy nations have tried to agree in UNCTAD upon an
international "Code of Conduct" for the transfer of technology. Wide disparities in attitudes toward
such a Code, which has now gone through many drafts, have been reflected by the developing
nations' insistence that it be "international legal binding", and the industrialized nations' positions
that it consist of "guidelines" for the international transfer of technology").
13

Territoriality is affected by the globalization of markets including the almost perfect mobility of

capital across borders and to a lesser extent mobility of persons including scientists as well as
legal entities such as multinational companies owning major innovative resources and operating
globally.

16
15
result there are a large number of plurilateral, 14 regional and bilateral treaties
as well as unilateral measures taken by some countries,1 7 that as a whole8
conforms a global network of IPR that results in, at least, a minimum1
substantive path of harmonization of domestic patent systems. Likewise, many
states have ceded some of their sovereignty to coordinate their actions in order
to facilitate the acquisition of patents.1 9 This increasing role of international
agreements aimed to facilitate the acquisition of patent rights shows that owners
of a single invention are seeking protection in many countries. Hence, given the
adoption of minimum substantive standards for patent regulation and an
increasing pressure to coordinate the acquisition of patents across domestic
boundaries, the issue to be analyzed herein may conform a third stage within the
process of international patent law harmonization 20 by which domestic or regional
14

Such as TRIPs which includes the former provisions of the Paris Convention and is managed

by the World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO). Moreover, within organizations such as
World Intellectual Property Organization (hereinafter WIPO) there are proposals to extend the
current stage of international harmonization by treaties such as the Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, see WIPO website, www.wipo.org.
15 As a consequence of the appearance of Regional Trade Agreements such as the
European
Union that established the European Patent Convention (hereinafter EPC) signed on 5 October
1973 in Munich creating the European Patent Organization; the North America Free Trade Area
(hereinafter NAFTA), the African Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO) and the
Euroasian Patent Convention.
16 See, for example, chapters XVII of U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Australia treaties,
chapter 16 of the
U.S.-Singapore treaty, article 4 of the US-Jordan treaty, article 15 of the US-Morocco treaty, as
examples of bilateral agreements entered by the U.S. establishing higher levels of patent
protection than those agreed upon TRIPs, which has been called TRIP-plus agreements.
Furthermore, this path of bilateral treaties is likely to include Andean countries (Peru, Colombia,
Ecuador, as well as Peru and Bolivia) and Panama in the short term.
17 For the U.S. see Timothy Holbrook "Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in
the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad", U.C. Davis Law Review, 701, (2004).
18 As it is assumed for countries signatories of TRIPs, see its article 1 (1).

19 This was first done by The Paris Convention and, now more importantly, is done by The Patent
Cooperation Treaty formed in 1970 (hereinafter PCT) that, according to an important patent
scholar, was an effort by US to head the harmonization path vis-a-vis the emerging European
Community and its EPC, see Martin Adelman, Randall R. Rader, John R. Thomas and Harold C.
Wegner, Cases and Materials on Patent Law, 1042 (Thomson West edit., Second Edition, 2003)
(hereinafter "Adelman, Patent Law").
20 After citing the achievements of those treaties in helping to acquire
patent rights globally,
Martin Adelman states: "But few conventions support patentees seeking to enforce their collection

patent rights are to be enforced beyond the boundaries of the state which
granted them or "the registering state".
Before keep going I would like to make clear that my goal is not to guess the
future. Instead, just by assuming that there will be further development of
international free trade policies throughout the world I think one may conclude
that the substantive harmonization of international patent rights may also boost
international patent litigation. This does not necessarily mean stronger or weaker
intellectual property rights, just that a more finely-tuned harmonized standard
comprising somehow most of those domestic standards of patent regulation, may
finally emerge. 21 Such a third stage may be not only required by multinational
companies making business worldwide or as measures to allow small and
medium sized businesses 22 to enter the international markets, but also by
governments desiring to save judicial resources and promote an international
cooperation that benefits all of its members. In spite of the theoretical aspect of
an issue such as international patent litigation, as long as patent rights are
conferred for at least 20 years, those obtaining patents today may find out that
the expected value derived from them is different when enforced in a system that
may emerge in 5, 10 or 15 years. Hence, international regulation of patent rights
seems to have a solid ground to be analyzed by lawmakers and scholars as well
as to expect it may affect patent practitioners and their clients.
1.2) Tension between territoriality and universality.
In my opinion, one of the best rationales to explain the current stage forming the
said "International Patent System" is the trade-off, or tension, between
territoriality and the proposals to adopt supranational standards, that here will be
of patents against increasingly multinational infringers. The result is a fragmented scheme of
world patent enforcement often plagued by burdensome litigation fees and inconsistent
outcomes", see Adelman Patent Law, supra, note 16, at 1042.
21

An alternative result is that given the different incentives to regulate IPR between DC and

LDCs, the harmonization process may lead to develop two different general standards of patent
protection. That is to be determined by many factors which are difficult to estimate accurately at
this time. Overall it has been said that ("the risk that intellectual property rights slow the
movement of technological capability to developing nations, suggests that harmonization efforts
might most wisely consider one common standard for developed nations and a different one for
developing nations") John Barton, Intellectual property, biotechnology, and international trade.
Two examples, prepared for Berne World Trade Forum, Bern University, August, 28-29 1999,
cited by Carlos Correa, Review of the TRIPs Agreement: fostering the transfer of technology to
developing countries, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/foster.htm.
22

Hereinafter "SMB".

called universality, in order to regulate the acquisition, use, transfer and finally
protection of patent rights across domestic borders.23
1.3.) Rejecting a unique global patent system.
Regarding the issue of how to regulate the international patent system there are
many factors to take into account. However, for simplicity I shall identify and
depart from two theoretically extreme proposals. The first is absolute in terms of
keeping multiple domestic systems without much interconnection, which is to be
called absolute territoriality. The opposing one is absolute in terms of achieving a
global or unique supranational system called here universality. It seems to me
that the best choice available on practical grounds is found somewhere in the
middle according to a given upward path of globalization requiring some sort of
international harmonization of patent rights.24
Therefore, the array of optimal solutions should be directed to reach the best
balance between both, the principles of territoriality and universality.25 The main
advantage to be gained from the territorial principle is that it allows countries to
develop the policies most suitable to themselves through a mixture of legal
theories and social values guiding the regulation of patents.2 6 On the other hand,
a universal set of standards may encourage more efficiency and fairness on
global transfer of novel information and knowledge protected by patents.
But if we look at the costs, aside from the political and economic costs to switch
towards a universal system, a theoretical argument against such a system is that

23

For an in-depth elaboration of this tension between the downward territoriality and the upward

international

harmonization

principles

see Graeme W. Austin,

Valuing

"Domestic Self-

Determination" in International Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. R. 11551211 (2002).
24

Janice M. Mueller, supra, note 10, at 358, ("Harmonization as applied to patent law refers to

efforts to bring the patent law systems of different countries into alignment by reducing or
eliminating the differences between them ....
Harmonization is not unification, which seeks to
establish one unified "world patent" system"). This is the starting point of a rationale keeping both
principles interacting.
A more unified global patent system is currently being studied and proposed, for example, Paul

25

Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, European Intellectual Property Review European
Intellectual Property Review, Vol. 25, 515 (2003).
See a further elaborated concept of domestic self-determination in Graeme W. Austin, supra,

26

note 23.

different domestic patent systems allow us to undertake a comparative analysis
to test and decide which is the best among many.27
Moreover, the costs of judicial errors regarding the legal regulation of innovative
activity are actually reduced by the diversification of jurisdictions for each
domestic court decides its own cases. Given that the amount of information
required to set up the right balance between the social costs of these limited
legal monopolies, i.e.: denial of access, versus their social benefits, i.e.:
incentives to innovate, is so high, this strategy of diversification may be an
optimal solution to diminish the potential error costs in the adjudication process of
any international patent system. Therefore, through the use of an increasingly
harmonized international standard of patent protection and its enforcement by
domestic systems, the overall innovative global activity may not be hurt as much
as it might be if a central monopoly-authority were to decide all patent cases. The
reason for this is that such a unified adjudicatory system of decisions would have
global consequences so that error costs might be increased for all actors
involved in these activities, as all-or-nothing is the only outcome of possible
global decisions.
Hence, an optimal outcome from the tension between those two principles should
benefit governments, producers (both those who invest scarce sources to
generate innovation and their competitors who are engaged in creating further
innovation), as well as consumers worldwide.
1.4) Interaction between international harmonization of substantive
domestic patent law and how they may be globally enforced.
Many authors agree on the existence of a link, meaning a function in economic
language, between a growing tendency towards harmonization of diverse patent
systems with less costs of enforcing those harmonized rights worldwide, which is
the rationale to assert that "the application of foreign patent law should be less
difficult as the international harmonization of patent law progresses".28

27

Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The development and incorporation of International Norms in the

Formation of International Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L. J., 733, (2001). The same scholar
names this function regarding the TRIPs as a "neo-federalist structure", see Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Preserving The Public Domain of Science under
International Law,in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTURAL PROPERTY REGIME, (J. Reichman, K. Maskus,
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004).
28 Fritz Blumer, Jurisdiction and Recognition in Transatlantic Patent Litigation,
9 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 329, *398 (hereinafter "Blumer Transatlantic Patent Litigation"). The same author
says in another publication that "If
critical issues such as the scope of protection of a patent are
governed by identical substantive law in the forum state and in the state where the patent is valid,

I will not address the topic of substantive harmonization in greater detail but I will
state that as the global market expands filing foreign patent applications is
required for innovators to acquire substantive rights of protection abroad. This
leading free trade policy shared by most countries may go further in the
harmonization of patents rights, although not so far as to reach a universal or
unified system for the reasons stated above. Hence, the costs of enforcing patent
rights worldwide may decrease because a consolidation of multiple claims in a
single forum may be easier to deal with, including their enforcement in the related
foreign forums.
The graph below illustrates the rationale to develop an international system to
enforce patent rights.

the enforcement of the foreign patent is easier for the court and the parties and the courts are
less reluctant to apply foreign law", Patent Law and International Private Law on Both Sides of the
Atlantic, WIPO, WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/3 (January 2001).
There are also others stating the said correlation between further harmonization of substantive
international patent law and its enforcement worldwide: John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the
Technological Frontier Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW &
POLICY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSS, 277, (1996) (hereinafter "John Tomas, Litigation
Beyond..."); Phillip L. McGarrigle, The Role of Foreign Judgments in Patent Litigation: a
perspective and strategic overview, IDEA 39 J. L & TECH, 107, (1998).
Going even further than just mentioning the said correlation, John Gladstone Mills Ill,
Transnational Patent Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84
No.2, Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, February, (2002) ("because the
increased technology traded and the increased technical data exchanged in the global economy,
the antiquated system of national patent protection presents a roadblock to future sustainable
economic growth").
But this is not an absolute-accepted view, for example Kyle Grimshaw, InternationalUpheaval: Patent
Independence Protectionistsand The Hague Conference, 0020 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. (2001), who argues
that given the differences among domestic patents laws the ("international patent system is not ready for a
rejection of the independence of patent infringement suits so that neither Hague Proposals nor other similar
treaties should include patent rights"). A similar opinion was stated by Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Jane C.
Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Recognition ofJudgments in IntellectualPropertyMatters, 77 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1065-1152, (2002).

Costs of
enforcing
patents
globally"-.

j

Decreasing
costs of global
enforcement

Cost of
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universality

Absolute
territoriality

Absolute harmonization
on unification

Overall, the graph aims to show the stated relation by which globalization led a
"dynamic between public international intellectual property standards and the role
of national courts 2 to enforce this array of harmonized patent rights.
The horizontal axis depicts increasing units of substantive harmonization of
patent laws from the left to the right until the last point where harmonization
becomes a universal-unified patent system. It is important to point out that this
graph does not include the dimension of the function representing whether
harmonization results in high or low protection of patent rights, although I will
assume that most exporters of intangible assets prefer higher protection than
importing countries. The vertical axis represents the increasing costs of enforcing
patents worldwide, higher from the bottom to the top. D represents the marginal
social costs of enforcing patent rights across domestic boundaries, which is a
function of the level of harmonization of domestic substantive patent laws.
A universal-unified patent system would present the lower cost of global
enforcement but it would sacrifice the benefits derived from having a soft
principle of territoriality, which is depicted by C as the marginal global costs
derived from losing territoriality.
In order to better understand that relation, let us assume that territoriality is the
only paradigm so that a consolidated array of disputes requires applying a
multiple-unharmonized bunch of domestic patent laws. Given complexities such
as the technical knowledge required to deal with patentable matters, the high
translation costs of describing the invention properly in each domestic patent
application and the potential bias of domestic courts against properly enforcing
29

Graeme B. Dinwoodie, supra, note 9, at 1009.

highly valuable inventions owned by foreigners, it is clear that the costs
associated with international litigation under a strict principle of territoriality are
high enough as to make that possibility undesirable. Thus, each patent is filed in
each country where protection is desirable. Moreover, each country is to examine
their own application and adjudicate potential disputes according to its own
substantive law. Under such a system, potential dissimilarities among domestic
laws makes best to enforce patent disputes within domestic boundaries.
However, most costs of enforcing patent rights in each country could be
diminished due to economics of scale if a single invention protected in many
countries can be litigated in a single court having proper technical skills and
conducting unbiased legal proceedings. Hence, as long as substantive
harmonization increases among countries, the costs to globally enforce those
(still domestic) patent rights may decrease and, furthermore, some social
benefits from free flow of judgments may be enjoyed.
Thus, even without a universal or unified system that would extinguish the
advantages of territoriality, there may be a point of equilibrium where the
international patent system enjoys both the advantages of a "soft" territorial
principle and the possibility of enforcing patent rights across borders. That
theoretical point is depicted in the graph as a black circle. Finding this point in the
real world is undoubtedly difficult, not only for the amount and quality of
information required but also for the overlapping existence of required minimum
standards under the TRIPs with higher levels of patent protection in most DCs
and LDCs members of bilateral agreements containing said high patent
protection. However, I think that this correlation is the most persuasive theoretical
argument to continue analyzing the interaction and complementation between
both the process of harmonization of public patent law and consolidation of legal
procedures under private patent law. Moreover, I will argue that the current
international patent system is too tied to territoriality while there may be some
benefits to gain if we could move that global optimal point to the right in the axis
measuring "units" of substantive harmonization, assuming this is desired.
Summing up, I have stated that globalization has lead to harmonization of
domestic patent systems. After rejecting the adoption of a universal or unique
system of substantive patent rights, the next question is how under "a soft"
principle of territoriality it is desirable and possible to allow private parties to
enforce their rights across domestic borders. The main issues to be coordinated
are allocation of jurisdiction among multiple forums, issues of choice of law, and
the establishment of mechanism to enforce legal decision in foreign countries. I
will focus on the allocation of jurisdiction because its structural design is
fundamental for consolidating legal decisions while the choice of law is assumed
to be up to the registering state under a soft principle of territoriality.
SECTION 2): CURRENT SYSTEMS REGULATING
LITIGATION OF PATENTS AND ONGOING PROPOSALS

INTERNATIONAL

2) International private law regulating cross border patent disputes:

The regulation of cross border disputes on patent rights, according to a
classification of international law, can be achieved through customary
international law (such as unilateral practices of countries), international
agreements (either bilateral or multilateral), or general principles common to
major legal systems, 30 as well as either by judicial or legislative competence.
There is a "de facto" treatment within the current practice of most states under
which no foreign patent right is to be enforced in a domestic court nor is a foreign
decision to be enforced therein, except some individual cases.3 1 Because it is
possible to gain some of the benefits of global enforcement I think that this is not
an optimal strategy for the current stage of international harmonization of patent
rights and the policies directed to promote international free trade.
Hence, aside from an exclusionary solution, it is possible to trace a classification
of potential systems to regulate the international litigation of patents:
a) Unilaterally
It is possible for a country32 to develop3an "international practice" or customary law
establishing
either issue or claim3 3 preclusion for recognizing and enforcing
foreign judgments.
b) Bilaterally
It is also possible 34 for countries to cooperate either implicitly by using reciprocity
or explicitly by signing a treaty establishing issue or claim preclusion.
c) Multilaterally
This is a different strategy providing the consolidation of multiple claims in a
single forum and its enforcement abroad, which requires the existence of a
multilateral agreement wherein its member countries agree on the bases of
jurisdiction, the applicable laws and the methods to enforce those decisions. The
30

Recognized in The Restatement of the Law (Third), Foreign Relations law of the United States,

Section 102.
31 As stated in the "Report of Special Committee Q 153", supra, note 5.
32 This is a strategy to avoid relitigation in some minimum extension, i.e.: facts.
33 This is a similar strategy having broader consolidation effects for it not only avoids relitigation of
factual issues but also induces private parties to bring similar or related claims before a single
court of origin.
34 There are incentives for states to entering agreements, Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic
Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679 (2003)("To the extent that the
actions and decisions of one State (or its citizen) may affect the welfare of another State (or its
citizen), negatively or positively, there is room for negotiation and potential cooperation between
the two States to minimize joint cost or maximize joint benefits"), at 690.

allocation of jurisdiction to decide what countries are allowed to be country of
origin on international disputes is a major issue to define because it has very
important consequences on the chances of successfully enforcing that judgment
in an addressed state. Another important issue is the scope of jurisdiction to be
exercised by the court of origin, mainly whether it is allowed to adjudicate
disputes about infringement of patent, their validity or both.
Throughout this paper I shall primarily focus on this multilateral approach by
addressing the drafted proposals and ongoing projects under The Hague
Conference, which has discussed the implementation of such a multilateral
system.3 5 However, before that task I shall briefly introduce the two major
systems used to set forth the framework of the Hague Conference: the European
and the U.S. models of jurisdiction.
2.1) The European Union.
So far the only place where cross border patent litigation has been regulated by
international agreements is the EU. 3 6 This is hardly surprising, as the EU has
been the leader in taking the strongest actions to develop a "free trade
community", including a premier supranational system for acquiring patents
rights.37
Although the validity of patent rights is, in principle, an issue of exclusive
jurisdiction of the state where the patent was granted according to article 16 (4)
of the Brussels Regulation, Dutch courts have found jurisdiction and issued cross
border injunctions based on the Brussels Conventions and the EPC. The
35 The Hague Conference is an intergovernmental organization working since 1955 "for the

progressive unification of the rules of private international law" (according to Article 1 of the
Statute of the Hague Conference), see http:www.hcch.net/ (hereinafter Hague Conference).
36
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Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, (hereinafter
"Brussels Convention") covering jurisdiction among European Union States; the European
Communities-European

Free

Trade Association:

Convention

on Jurisdiction

and
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Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988 (hereinafter Lugano
Convention), extending the Brussels Convention to the European Free Trade Association. Future
changes to these agreements seem to be coming, see Amended Proposal for a Council
Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial -Matters, COM (2000) 689 final (October 26, 2000).
37 1 mean the EPC which may be articulated to finally implement the long waited Community

Patent Convention (CPC) through regulations, see Christopher Heath, Harmonizing Scope and
Allocation of Patent Rights in Europe- Towards a New European Patent Law, 6 MARQ. INTELL.
PROPP. L. REV (2002).

European Court of Justice was near to deciding the issue of whether domestic
courts were able to adjudicate issues of validity of patent brought within actions
for infringements of foreign patents in Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd. V. Akzo
Nobel, 1998 but the case had been settled before. At the time this paper is being
written, the same issue is pending.38 If this court is to allow such multinational
actions within Europe, it will force further harmonization among domestic patent
laws including projects implementing regional patent rights for it may lead to
adjudicate the issues of infringement and validity39 in the same court. Hence
such a decision may modify the existing rules on jurisdiction under the Brussels
Conventions that clearly distinguish infringement from validity of patents each
with a separate rule of jurisdiction.
2.2) The United States
This field is mainly regulated by customary international law developed by judicial
decisions in the U.S., as "The United Sates is not party to any international
agreement regarding the mutual recognition of judgments, there is no federal
statute governing the issue and the impact of federal common law is slight".4 °
Moreover, there is not a clear rule or standard in the U.S. other than the
adherence to the comity principle,41 particularly to enforce foreign judgments.
Despite a general practice of recognition and enforcement of foreign decision on
matters other than patents, 2 the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
Section 482 provides: "Patents are considered territorial, having legal effect only
in the territory of the issuing state. Accordingly the United States has no
jurisdiction to apply its law to validate or invalidate a foreign patent, regardless of
the origin of the invention, or the nationality, residence, or principal place of
business of the holder of the patent or of any licensee". However, some patent
holders have based legal actions on supplemental jurisdiction and theories of
judicial efficiency.
38

See Roche Nederland B. V. v Dr F.J. Primus and Dr M.D. Goldenberg, at

http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/ippd/ecj/2003/c53903.htm.
39 As predicted in dicta in Expandable Grafts P'Ship v. Boston Scientific, B.C: (1999) F.S.R. 352
(Hof den Haag), where the court consolidated different cases involving defendants who were part
of the same group of companies.
40 Blumer, Transatlantic Patent Litigation,
*380.
41 Phillip L. McGarrigle, supra, note 28 ("The U.S. Supreme Court defined comity
as the

recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens, or of the other persons who are under the protection of its law").
42

See Section 491 (1) Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., establishing the

common principle of recognition of foreign decisions subject to reciprocity of recognition by the
rendering state.

43
2.3) Cases in the US

Undoubtedly territoriality has been strongly supported while shaping and applying
patent law in the U.S. It was not until some decades ago that the U.S. patent
system started to take into account foreign activities such as publications for
applying the standard of novelty. Likewise foreign prosecution of patents has
been used as extrinsic evidence to defeat novelty. These changes induced
commentators to state the existence of a diminished territorial principle.44
a) Recognition of foreign patent decisions in US
It is worth considering that the US Supreme Court used the notion of issue
45
preclusion regarding a foreign patent judgment in 1895 in Hilton v. Guyot.
However, perhaps due to historical and social reasons beyond the scope of this
paper,46 that attitude changed, as reflected in most case law after the beginning
of the twentieth Century although with some exceptions. For instance in Foln
Hookless Fastener Co. v. Lion Fastener, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q. 599, 561 (1936),
the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit relied on a Canadian judicial
decision to hold the invalidity of a US patent. There are also precedents where
U.S. courts gave deference to their foreign counterparts and patent offices to
decide on the validity of patents.47
However, The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated the irrelevance of
foreign decisions involving patent when deciding over domestic ones, in In re
Guinot, 76 F. 2d. 134, 135-36 (C.C.P.A. 1935). Moreover, its successor, The
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For a partial survey of US cases, see John G. Mills II, Robert C. Highley and Donald C. Reiley

Ill, Database updated November 2003, Westlaw Internet legal search engine.
44

Professor Holbrook states that regarding U.S. domestic substantive patent law, the most

important changes have occurred since the Patent Act was amended in 1952, see Holbrook,
supra, note 17, citing, among others, the change which made foreign activities to defeat the
validity of patents for applying the standard of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
45

159 US 113 (1895).
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Let us just recall that during the rule of territoriality most countries were engaged in a path of

nationalism and protectionism whose abolition has been the goal of the WTO and the former
GATT rounds towards international free trade.
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See John R. Thomas, supra, note 28, *308, citing holdings such as: U.S. Supreme Court in

Ashcroft v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in American InfraRed Radiant Co. v. Lambert Industries, and District Court for the Southern Disctrict of New York
in Inc., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp.

Federal Circuit, has maintained that precedent over time
"exclusionary rule" regarding foreign decisions.48

shaping

the

Some of the reasons to encourage a supranational patent system were
expressed in dicta by Judge B. Weinstein in re Cuno v. Pall. The case started in
New York when Cuno filed an action to declare Pall US patent invalid. While the
trial was going on, Pall filed an infringement action in Britain. The British Court
declared the patent valid and Pall argued before the US court that the facts found
by a foreign court should be taken into account i.e. applying collateral estoppel to
factual findings when the foreign patent "describes the same technological
invention and makes claims that are in all material ways identical to those
contained in defendants' United States patent".49
The District Court dismissed the motion because of the complexity of trying to
use British facts in the American case, although "discovery for the United States
case was used in the British action", as well as the Federal Circuit's general
antipathy to apply collateral estoppel in similar cases. The policy mentioned in
one of those cases was that "the public interests in upholding valid
patent ..... outweighs the public interest underlying collateral estoppel".5 °
However, Judge Weinstein stated in dicta the necessity to review the principle of
independence of patents under the Paris Convention, which disallows courts to
save public and private sources. Moreover, he pointed out that he was not
satisfied with disregarding a foreign decision such as the British one because
that forum had greater expertise than untrained US judges and jurors.
In Vas-Cath Inc. v. Marhurkar, 1 the former had been defendant and was found
liable for infringing a Canadian patent by a Canadian Court. Then Vas-Cath Inc
decided to sue Marhurkar in U.S. The district judge Easterbrook adopted an even
more radical vision against the controlling precedents of not recognizing foreign
decision. It was held that "Canadian judgment that patent infringement plaintiff
invented dual-lumen catheter tip covered by Canadian patent precluded
relitigation of that issue in action for infringement of American patent covering
same invention.... , Canadian court's judgment that Canadian patent covering
same invention was not anticipated by prior art was preclusive, even though
Canadian court's finding that a person skilled in art would not have been aware
of prior invention was irrelevant in United States." Despite its strong wording, the
case was reversed based on other grounds without any reference to the foreign
decision's issue preclusion effects or the like.
48

See John R. Thomas, supra, note 28.

49 Cuno Incorporated, v. Pall Corporation, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York,

729 F. Supp. 234; 1989 U.S.
Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals Tenth
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Circuit, 607 F.2d 885; 1979 U.S.
51 745 F.Supp 517 (N.D.III. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Currently, that posture towards recognizing foreign decision seems to be52clearly
in a minority and most of the time the latest cases deny such possibility.
b) ENFORCING FOREIGN PATENTS IN THE US.
Despite a belief that U.S. courts do not enforce such patents, there have been
cases holding otherwise. For example in Distillers Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 150
U.S.P.Q. 42 (N.D. Ohio 1964) the court found itself empowered to enforce
foreign patents and dismissed the difficulties of applying foreign patent law. In
Ortaman v. Stanray Corp, 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967) the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit recognized jurisdiction based on pending jurisdiction "if the
defendant performed similar acts both in and out of the U.S.". However that has
not been a widely-accepted posture of U.S. courts and in Packard Instrumental
Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc, 346 F. Supp. 408, 409 (N.D. II1. 1972) the
court recognized it had jurisdiction but did not assume it, based on the "forum
non conveniens" doctrine, taking into account difficulties such as the enforcement
of its decision abroad, translation costs and comity to foreign governmental acts.
In Stein Associates, Inc. v. Heat Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
the Federal Circuit stated that "only a British court, applying British Law, can
determine validity and infringement of British patents",53 without further reference
to the sources for that holding and did not recognize to have jurisdiction in order
to issue a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of British patents in
Great Britain.
This last approach was reaffirmed in Mars Inc. v Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon
Conlux 54 where the Federal Circuit rigorously applied the doctrine of "forum non
conveniens" creating a exclusionary rule for enforcing foreign patents in the U.S.
based on some differences between the Japanese and U.S. alleged-infringedpatents, which has been criticized.55
Overall, these cases reflect the minority posture for recognizing and enforcing
foreign judgments on patent matters. However, the basis of this judicial view may
be somewhat disconnected, or overdue, from official statements made by the
U.S. government before international institutions such as the WTO and, more
important, from the U.S. proposals brought within The Hague Conference.
Thus that protectionist judicial practice denying recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments may change in the near future as put forward by negotiators in
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See of example Merck & Co, Inc., v Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., United States District

Court, D. Delaware No. CIV.A.01-048-JJF. Aug. 28, 2003, as amended Jan. 7.
53 John R. Thomas, supra, note 28 *320.
54 US Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, 1994. 24 F3 1368, 30 USPQ 2d. 1621.
55 John R: Thomas, supra, note 28 *320.

the Hague Conference.56 The fact that the executive branch is taking a broader
view towards international patent litigation may be based on the recognition and
reaction to the same factors damaging the principle of territoriality worldwide. The
reason for this institutional lawmaking change may be that the executive branch
of the government has greater capacity to overtake a detailed analysis and to
implement more "practical" responses to this reality than an overburdened
judicial branch. Ultimately, the regulation of international affairs including the
regulation of international commerce is under the power endorsed to the
Executive branch acting with consent of the Senate.5 7
SECTION 3): WHY PROMOTING CROSS BORDER PATENT LITIGATION
THROUGH A MULTINATIONAL SYSTEM OF CONSOLIDATING CLAIMS IS
IMPORTANT BUT PROBLEMATIC IN THE SHORT TERM.
In this section I shall point out and discuss the most common arguments to
support and counter the recognition and enforcement, if not the consolidation, of
foreign decisions involving patent rights. This is a general overview, and some of
the arguments will be used and applied in greater detail below.
3.1) BENEFITS OF CONSOLIDATING INTERNATIONAL PATENT CASES:

56

For example this citation included in the background of the, Notice of Hearing and Request for

Comments on Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, ("The impetus behind the request was to gain recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments in other countries. While U.S. Federal courts generally will recognize and enforce
judgments from other countries under state law (see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), U.S.
judgments do not always receive the same treatment abroad") at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/ab25.html (last visited April 2004). However,
the U.S. has taken particular postures towards and against the goal of harmonizing patent law.
Anneliese M. Seifert, Will the United States Take the Plunge Into Global Patent Law
Harmonization? A Discussion of the United States 'Past, Present, and Future Harmonization
Efforts, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV., 173 (2002), identifies some factors to be taken into
account when analyzing the U.S. view in this matter such as ("(1) the different objectives of large
corporations and the small inventor lobby, (2) the differences in philosophy regarding patent laws
between the United States and the rest of the world, (3) the different approaches of United States
political parties, and (4) the United States' need to help business and individuals protect their
technology in a global marketplace by seeking stronger protection abroad and lower international
filing costs").
57 See U.S. Constitution, Article II Section 2, allocating the power to create the policy governing
foreign relations into the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal Government.

a) To implement the principles and policies governing international
patent law stated in Article 7 of TRIPs.
Recognizing the difficulties to set the values for leading the development of such
system, there is still article 7 of TRIPs, which should to be used as a source of
public international law guiding the major goals of international patent litigation.
The objectives or policies of TRIPs are: "The protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantagqe of producers and users of technoloqical
knowledqe and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of riqhts and obligqations"
In section five I offer a general rationale to guide the implementation of this
objective through the international litigation of patent rights.
b) To promote policies of fairness for private litigants while saving judicial
resources.
Both goals require to establish some sort of preclusion for avoiding multiple or
step-by-step litigation.58 The optimal goal is to discourage relitigation by a loser
plaintiff after "having its day in the court" in another forum, as it creates double
judicial expenses and increases
the private cost of defendants to spend more
59
actions.
multiple
in
resources
However, a multinational system directed to consolidate domestic jurisdictions
requires a balance between the efficiency gained by reducing the amounts of
litigation and the accuracy or "fairness" of that single judgment. Given that such a
system requires its member countries to coordinate their efforts, one of the most
important features to design is the allocation of jurisdiction, for were it not to be
accepted later by the addressed court, there would be more litigation and
troubles for private parties. Furthermore, a balanced system to consolidate
overlapping jurisdiction not only is to preclude relitigation but also is to incentive
potential parties to select "ex ante", the most appropriate forum for a particular
case. Hence, there are clear benefits for promoting restriction of multiple forum
that alleviates dockets to the benefit of private parties, i.e. speed in the decision
making process and saving of domestic judicial resources.
58

Robert C. Cassad, Issue Preclusion and foreign country judgments; whose law?, IOWA L. REV

October 1984.
59 Particularly in the US, litigation costs over patents are clearly high. It has been pointed out that
the median cost of litigation on matters with a value ranged from 1 to 25 millions dollars is 1,5
million while those exceeding 25 millions may skyrocket up to 3 billon dollars, according to
American Intellectual Property Law Association, 2001, Economic Survey, cited in Jonathan Levin
and Richard Levin, Patent Oppositions, in Economics for an Imperfect World:
Essays in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz, (R. Arnott, B. Greenwald, R. Kanbur, and
B. Nalebuff edits, MIT Press, 2003).

c) To avoid inconsistent judgments thus promoting
certainty in international transactions.

uniformity and

This is a problematic issue emerging from overlapping domestic jurisdictions
enforcing related inventions as it was seen in the Epilady cases where domestic
European Courts interpreted in different ways the scope of protection for similar
patented inventions according to each domestic patent law.6 °
Given that domestic patent law is not fully harmonized, we should not expect a
perfect array of identical outcomes for similar cases. This will one of the
acceptable "costs" of having a soft territorial principle in the international patent
system. However, those differences should not lead to making it impossible for
the parties to comply with at least two (opposite) decisions. The latter is the
current goal stated in the EU regulation 61 and it should be a desirable goal for a
consolidation system of international patent claims, as a second best choice.
As will be remarked below, uncertainty may lead to more litigation or settlement
of cases with undesirable consequences for consumers if potential competitors
are risk-neutral or risk-averse for less competition leads to less production giving
the only producer, the patentee, a market power to charge prices beyond the
optimal level according to the scope of his or her patented invention.
d) To disincentive the unilateral use of domestic law with extraterritorial
effects.62
It is clear that in shaping
63 an "international patent system" there may be opposite
views and interests. However, a successful system capable of operating in the
medium and long term should avoid the abuse of unilateral measures damaging
other members to avoid further unilateral retaliatory responses of those affected
countries. The use, and sometimes abuse, of instruments such as the Special
301 and the GPS, together with their European counterparts, has been the main
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See Avv. Mario Franzosi, Three European cases on equivalence. Will Europe adopt catnic?,

available at http://www.franzosi.com/english/article/legals08.htm (last visited June 2004)
61 Article 22 (3) Brussels Convention.
62

This issue is not only present in intellectual property matters but, as globalization evolves, is

included in taxes and antitrust as shown by the efforts to coordinate unilateral measures taken by
OECD organization, as well as regarding securities regulation where there has been efforts to
coordinate it within the International Organization of Securities Commission, see John Norton
Moore, Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance Law, V 97 No.2, 289, American Journal
of International Law ( 2003).
63 See, supra, footnote no. 8.

tool to force LDCs to raise their level of IP protection. 64 Moreover, regarding the
U.S. patent system, the enactment of the "offer for sale" as a source of
infringement implied a great potential application of US law abroad, due to its
potential application even if lacking the minimum contacts for personal
jurisdiction.65
The main cause of concern about escalating unilateral retaliatory measures is
that even assuming an unbiased and non arbitrary judgment issued by a court of
origin its enforcement abroad may constitute a transfer of wealth between
nations,66 thus increasing the pressure for protectionist measures in either way:
to protect domestic activity abroad by a net exporter country or to restrict the
level of protection of foreign law in a given net importer country. For example, a
common forum to litigate patents such as the US, where many foreign
companies have assets, may be tempted to unilaterally assume both the role of
court of origin and requested state by seizing those assets located within US,
which may lead to future retaliatory actions by a group of countries affected by
such a conduct unless they also have some of their interests protected. Overall,
uncoordinated domestic laws with extraterritorial effects may lead countries to
reinforce extreme views regarding patents in the long term. Thus, incentives will
be created for extreme countries to go further and become information hells or
havens. 67
e) To bring greater certainty, uniformity and neutrality along different
domestic patent systems which may foster Small and Medium Sized
Businesses.
International Free Trade theories guide governments to open their economies
and trade with each other based on their own comparative relative advantages. It
has been argued that either international trade only benefits MNEs or it hurts
SMB, which cannot compete efficiently with big firms. Despite this debate goes
64 For an excellent description of the problems encountered by the U.S. when relying on unilateral

measures to assure IP protection in Argentina, see Hernan L. Bentolila, Lesson from the United
States Trade Policies to convert a pirate: The case of pharmaceutical patents in Argentina, 5 Yale
J. L. & Tech. 1.
65 See Timothy Holbrook, supra, note
17.
66

Because these unilateral practices may result in exporting a "monopoly" on a subject

considered to be in the public domain in the importing country, or the other way around.
67

See Intellectual Property: Principles governing jurisdiction,choice of law, and judgments in

transnational disputes", Preliminary Draft No. 2, January 20, 2004, The American Law Institute
("Information havens" - states that are perceived as favouring intellectual property users or that
move their dockets too slowly to provide effective justice. "Information hells" - states that are seen
as favouring intellectual property owners"), at 19.

beyond the scope of this paper 68 and taking into account that most international
trade has been done by Multinational Enterprises 69, there may be some grounds
to point out the possibility of gains for SMB from bringing greater certainty and
uniformity among domestic legal systems.
For example, some scholars70 have justified the existence of MNEs as a market
failure: relative high cost of cross-borders transactions allow MNEs to find a gap
which later becomes a niche only contested by other MNEs. Not only differences
among domestic laws and regulations but also relative advantages on raising
capital as well as attracting the best managers of knowledge have allowed MNEs
to dominate international markets for more than a Century since the end of
1800s. 7 1 Hence, more harmonization may help SMB and start-up business to
compete, or be less affected, with the ability of MNEs to internalize and reduce
the risks of substantial differences in domestic laws.
If this is a real explanation about the success of MNEs to operate internationally
it will be worth considering the benefits to gain through harmonization, which may
68
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firms see Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries
of the Firm, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, discussion paper
No. 480, ("Only legally protected inventions, i.e. patented inventions, may be traded; pre-patent
stages of the innovation process may not. Consequently, by force of law, rather than by the
guidance of economic principle, pre-patent innovation must be carried out within the boundaries
of a single firm"). A similar rationale may apply for the international market of innovative products.
In fact this have been recognized as a problem for the transfer of technology to LDCs. Carlos
Correa cited authors pointing out that "a decline in the importance of contractual or non-equity
modes of technology transfer has been observed in several studies... Internalized forms of
technology transfer (i.e. those taking place intra-firm) are more likely to be preferred by
technology holders when the technology changes rapidly and when potential recipients may pose
competitive threats in world markets as future competitors", see, supra, note 21.
69 Hereinafter "MNE". David K. Eiteman, Arthur L. Stonehill,
Michael H. Moffett,
"MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS FINANCE (Addison-Wesley Series in Finance, Tenth Edition
2004) ("Multinational enterprise is defined as one that has operating subsidiaries, branches or
affiliates located in foreign countries... MNEs are headquartered all over the world. Many of them
are owned by a mixture of domestic and foreign stockholders ....
The transactions are usually
managed from a global perspective rather than from the perspective of a single country"), at 2.
70

Id.

71 Another

possible choice for MNEs to internalize the legal differences among domestic patent

systems is the capability to globally acquire or to negotiate a concurrent use with a start up firm
having a valuable patented invention to gain more market power, although this strategy is
increasingly subject to antitrust scrutiny in most DCs.

allow SMB to conduct business more efficiently and to serve international
markets.72
3.2) DISADVANTAGES AND OBSTACLES OF INTERNATIONAL PATENT
CONSOLIDATION:
a) Technical background required to analyze the legal requirement for
patentability, validity and infringement of patents.
This is a commonly stated justification against a free flow of patent judgments. It
is true that there are large differences in the technical background among
domestic patent offices and courts resulting in different levels of knowledge
gained by "learn-by-doing" favoring those offices with more innovation activity to
oversee. Likewise there are huge differences among the operative budgets of
patent offices. As a result there is a dissimilar capacity to properly examine the
accomplishment of requirements for patentability and to deal with disputes
regarding infringement and validity of patents. 7 Yet regarding these differences
there are some further considerations to make.
First, even in the US patent system the precision and expertise can be partially
adjudicated to the administrative agency conducting examinations, the USPTO,
and to the patent bar that is required to deal with the complexities of the U.S.
72

The impact on SMB will ultimately depend on the rules of the international patent litigation

game. If very flexible rules on jurisdiction for infringement action are taken, the search cost to
avoid infringement for SMB will rise as will be discussed below.
73 However, some Latin American countries have made efforts to set specialized courts to deal

with such complex issues as patents. For example, "On September 30, 1991 Chile enacted a new
industrial property law (that) also created a special Court of Appeal for industrial property matters,
the one which may review, revoke or confirm any decision of the administrative authority. These
special Court of Appeal also deals with plant breeders rights cases", Mr. Sergio Escudero,
presentation at "APEC INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SYMPOSIUM TOKYO, AUGUST
1996", available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin-e/kenkyukai_e/chile.htm (last visited
July 2004).

legal patent system such as the peripheral system to draft claims 74 and the "first
to invent" legal standard for allocating ownership of inventions. The reasons are
not only that judges are not required to have any scientific background in order to
decide a case but also the use of juries to reach a final decision regarding
infringement, as Judge Weinstein expressed in Cuno case.75
Second, there is the emerging debate about the trade off between ex-ante
control over the "quality of patents" by the patent office examination process
(called "Examination System") and ex-post market control (called "Registration
System"),76 which may affect the presumption of validity of already granted
patents,77 The main difference is that in a Registration System the present value
of the large public expenses incurred by patent offices to closely examine patent
applications are diminished if that scrutiny is taken by private parties through
litigation on the validit' of already granted patents, without such a close
examination of patents.
One may argue that based on a self-interest rationale, net importer countries of
intangible assets could avoid spending large amounts of public funds on
examination procedures if net exporter countries are to properly examine
74 F. Scott Kieff, The case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-

Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003), ("A determination of infringement under a central
claiming approach requires the court to determine the heart of the invention to justify a judgment
of infringement. A determination under peripheral claiming requires the court to determine only
the outer bounds of the claim. Anything within those bounds infringes and anything outside does
not"), at 55. Therefore, US patent lawyers have to decide carefully how to claim broadly enough
to gain further scope of rights while also avoiding to be anticipated by prior art. The expertise
required to deal with these system might explain the requirement for scientific background that is
a standard in the legal market for firms in the US.
75 It is noteworthy that even the Federal Circuit, which is the forum consolidating most appellate
disputes in US, is not required to have a technical background. Overall, Professor Martin J.
Adelman has said that the use of juries has created "a system of justice that is basically a
lottery", cited by Francesco Parisi and Kimberly A. Moore, Rethinking Forum Shopping in
Cyberspace, 77 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 1325 (2002), footnote 19.
This debate has been imposed after critics pointed out the low quality of patent granted by the
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USPTO, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW U. L. REV. 1495
(2001), particularly his citation of critics at footnote no. 1.
77 See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
78 A main argument for a Registration System is that "information (to decide the validity of

patents) is more cheaply obtained, provided, and evaluated by private parties, including the
patentee and competitors of the patentee, than by the government" F. Scott Kieff, supra, note 74,
at 19.

counterpart applications beforehand. The argument is more compelling if
importer countries do not have an absolute standard of novelty and relay on
some sort of "de facto" Registration System, which may allow them to invest
public resources only in the last stage where a certain social valuable patent is
litigated. As an example of such possibility the Argentine Patent Office issued a
resolution 79 which allowed it to accelerate the prosecution of prior pending
applications having foreign counterparts successfully prosecuted in some
countries with similar patent law to Argentina that also complied with the
requirements of patentability, subject to some other conditions. Undoubtedly, this
is a free ride on costly examinations conducted by foreign offices, which might be
an efficient one-shoot strategy to save public funds and alleviate dockets.
The result of these debates may have important consequences on a costbenefits analysis of international litigation of patents. Were most countries 80 to
decide for a "Registration System", the assumption that a granted patent is valid,
which is based on the fact that the patentability requirements were closely
studied during the examination, should be relaxed 81 so that a future increasing
role of litigation to control the "quality of patents" would also have implications for
an international system to litigate patents. Regarding the lack of technical and
financial capabilities of LDCs, there is also the obligation of DCs to assist LDCs
in reaching the required capacity to implement international obligations according
to TRIPs, article 67. Overall, were these changes to happen 82 the debate about
the expertise and technical background of a decision maker (examiner, judge,
jury or arbitrator) should be extended.
c) Resistance of countries to give up their sovereignty on innovative

activity - Patent rights under the act of state doctrine.
The "act of state" doctrine 83 has led to distinguish among intellectual property
rights according to the level of implication of the administration in their creation,
79 Resolution no. P-263-03, 16t h December 2003 available at INPI website, www.inpi.gov.ar, only

in Spanish.
80 As pointed out through the Argentinean example, for LDCs there may be incentives to rely on

examinations already made by a foreign patent offices or by WIPO for international applications
under the PCT thus avoiding expending public and private resources until litigation arises.
If not eliminated as pointed out by Kieff, supra, note 74, at 17.

81

82 Let us recall that under TRIPs countries have plenty of room to implement the required

minimum standards.
Defined in The Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986) §

83

443 (1) as: "In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the validity of a
taking by a foreign state of property within its territory, or from sitting in judgment on other acts of
a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there".

registration and protection. Obviously industrial rights are largely created with a
concurrent active participation of some official branch of a government,
especially patents for an applicant has to "negotiate" the award of the title with an
examiner. This doctrine applies to trademarks in lesser extent and is very
different for copyrights and related rights.84
Basically, the rationale is that only a court, or the Patent Office in some states
such as in Japan, of the country that granted a patent should have jurisdiction to
invalidate it later.
It goes without saying that this doctrine may be necessarily affected not only by
the globalization process creating supranational entities empowered with former
sovereign rights of countries,85 but also by market forces demanding more
efficient mechanism to solve disputes. This "judicial globalization" is noted for
example by the increasing use of arbitration allowing a no governmental
desicionmaker to treat both validity and infringement of registered patents.
Besides the movement towards allowing arbitration over validity of patents in
some countries, the great number of LDCs that joined the New York
Convention 86 during recent years has put pressure on countries to design better
systems to solve international disputes.87
Despite the importance of international arbitration there are some points to
underline. In general terms, the function of both systems seems to differ. On the
one hand an optimal system for consolidating international litigation is to achieve
the goal of protecting legitimate interest affected by the patent title in the most
efficient and fair possible way, which requires the decision to have erga ommes
effects. So relaying only on arbitration would have important social costs for
"unlike many other settlements of litigation, settlements of patent litigation
between rivals by their nature implicate competition, and thus tend to have
effects on third parties, most notably (but not only) customers of the litigation
parties".88
So only using arbitration may not serve the function of avoiding infringement
between unrelated parties but of solving unforeseeable events between related
parties, for example parties in a license contract. There are also other
undesirable features if we were just to rely solely on arbitration including "its
84

This is a rule of thumb with caveats in some countries, i.e. countries requiring registration of

copyrights.
85 See for example European Community Patent project.
86 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
New York, 10 June 1958, (hereinafter New York Convention).
See parties and dates of entry at http://www.uncitral.org/ website.

87

88 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 Rand Journal of Economics No.2
(2003) at 391.

inability to generate precedents and to render a clear-cut victory because
arbitrators have a reputation for "splitting the baby".8 g
However, the increasing use of international arbitration of patents may open the
gates to international litigation as both share some common conditions. For
instance they both require the effective enforcement of the arbitral or judicial
decision in the addressed state. This last issue of enforcing arbitration
procedures is particularly important in LDCs because most of them have usually
found reasons to deny their effective enforcement within their territories based on
"public interest" theories.
One practical reason for domestic governments to keep some power over patent
regulation is the relevance of pubic funding of R&D activities, meaning taxpayers
paying in order to promote innovative products. A 1999 OECD report stated that
in the U.S. 66% and in the EU 56% of R&D was carried out by industry; other
sources provide information about Latin American countries like Brazil and Chile
with over 50% government funding for R&D, while in Argentina it was 46% and
32% in Venezuela.90 These numbers show that governments have a direct role in
promoting and enjoying the fruits of innovative activity, even though they may
ultimately refer to other public goods associated to R&D such as national
defense in the U.S.91
Moreover there are huge disparities regarding the availability of financial
resources for an efficient use of patents as economic-welfare-tools. It has been
stated that "the distribution of the capabilities to generate science and technology
gives rise, in fact, to the most dramatic North-South asymmetry.. World R&D
expenditures are very asymmetrically distributed: developing countries, the most
recent estimates, only account for about 4 per cent of global R&D expenditures".
92 Moreover, the use of patents rights as pure economic-welfare-tools has been
discussed, and rejected, by most DCs since the first international negotiations
where prevailed the view of patents as private rights.93 Hence the concurrent

89 See Julia A. Martin, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather than Litigating in Los Angeles: The
Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolutions, 49
STAND. L. REV. 917 (1997), at 955.
90

See Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties, Working

Paper 9114, NBER Website, http:www.nber.org/papers/w9114, (last visited February 2004).
91 See 35 U.S.C. Chapter 18, Patent Rights in Inventions made with Federal Assistance,
particularly § 200 "Policy and objective" and § 204 "Preference for U.S. industry".
Carlos Correa, supra, note 21.
93 The discussion about patents as private right versus patent as public policy tools has
arises
92

since the Vienna Conference prior the Paris Convention, see Emerson Stringham, Patents and
Gebrauchmuster, in 36 INTERNATIONAL LAW, cited in Graeme. B. Dinwoodie, William 0

use of public and private investment may be a point of discussion in developing a
more "global" patent system given the connection between innovative activity
with other domestic policies such as public defense and access to public health.
Overall, managing the expenditures on R&D to serve other particular social goals
is to depend on more variables than just international patent litigation, which in
turn may indirectly help to reach those goals if it brings more certainty and
efficiency into the global market of innovation.
For developing countries, particularly those with capacity to free ride or compete
on foreign technology, there would be even stronger incentives for using patents
as welfare instruments. However,
limiting this opportunity was one of the goals
94
DCs achieved with TRIPs.
d) Substantial differences on procedures among countries:
Many issues to be included here are derived from differences among the
discovery systems of common law countries and those ones based on civil law.
However, the fact that most countries rely on a first-to-file standard to establish
ownership of inventions makes the requirement of a "powerful" procedural
discoveries less necessary than in the U.S. Moreover the U.S. is already very
open to some facts that occur abroad not only to determine infringement actions
but also issues of validity of patents 95 .
e) Lack of a central authority to reexamine a decision taken by a court
affecting another court.
This may happen in all fields where international private law can be used for
beneficial purposes. Still it is desirable to explore a sort of central authority of last
resort. For example, it may be a good idea to empower an existing authority such
as the Council of WTO to review questions of law in the application of
international accepted standards of patent law hence promoting further
Hennessey and Shira Perlmutter, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW, (Lexis
Nexis edits., 2001), at 305-314
94 For example, by limiting the use of compulsory licenses according to article 31 of TRIPs. The

willingness and necessity of LDCs to use patents as welfare tools has showed up in, for instance,
the discussion about access to medicines covered by the Doha Agenda in Public Health Access.
However some LDCs may follow a restrictive strategy to grant compulsory licenses such as Chile,
perhaps due to the fact that it does not have a level of industrial development to compete with
DCs. Compulsory licenses can be granted in Chile "only in case of monopoly abuse of the right
holder, circumstances which are qualified by a special court which deals with economic cases.
Compulsory license may be grant only under non exclusive basis, must have a specific duration
and the licensee must pay a royalty to the right holder" Sergio Escudero, supra, note 73. The
scope for granting compulsory licenses is even greater in Argentina and Brazil.
95 See Holbrook, supra, note 17.

harmonization. As a minimum, those decisions issued by the adjudicatory bodies
to solve disputes within TRIPs-WTO should be followed by national court as
principles of public international intellectual property law.
f) Increasing the opportunistic use of forum shopping.
Given the differences in substantive law and procedures among countries, which
cannot be solved by a central "supranational" authority, there are concerns about
some undesirable consequences of having overlapping jurisdictions in
consolidating patent cases. This is particularly acute in relation with countries
which hold opposing interests regarding patent regulation such as DCs and
LDCs.
The starting point is that there are countries with asymmetric incentives to
regulate innovative activity so that they may finally become IP hells or havens
respectively. 96 These different incentives have an important effect in a system to
consolidate claims over patent infringement and validity because they create exante asymmetries between potential parties of a dispute. 97 Ex-ante asymmetries
means that the role distribution between who is to be plaintiff (owners of
intangible assets in DCs-IP-hell countries) and defendant (free riders based in
LDCs-IP-havens) is not randomly established but decided by strategic behavior
of one or both of the parties before entering into a relation or choosing a certain
unilateral conduct such as whether to infringe a patent right or not in a selected
jurisdiction. The existence of ex-ante asymmetries creates distributional and
efficiency effects, which constitute the most harmful effects of forum shopping.98
Distributional effects: Forum shopping may be endured when it occurs within
domestic borders for it is at least a redistribution of wealth among parties
pertaining to the same country or region. That is not the case in international
cases where a domestic judgment may mean a redistribution of wealth among
different countries. In such a case there may be an incentive for governments to
protect their own manifestations of wealth which may further incentive retaliation
measures among countries so that by these strategies even greater costs are
imposed on those who engaged in international transactions. Even worse, the
96 Regarding the different incentives to regulate patents and other IPR see Carlos Correa,

Managing the Provision of Knowledge: The Design of Intellectual Property Laws, in PROVIDING
PUBLIC GOODS - MANAGING GLOBALIZATION, (I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. Le Gaulven and R.
Mendoza edits, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003), and Paul J. Heald, Mowing the playing
field: addressing information distortion and asymmetry in the Trips Game, 88 MINNES. L. REV.
(2003).
97 See Francesco Parisi and Kimberly A. Moore, supra, note 75.
98 For a discussion over those harmful and benign effects of forum shopping see Kimberly
A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in patent cases: Does geographic choice affect innovation?, 79 N.C. L.
Rev. 889 (2001).

establishment of information hells and havens is further encouraged in the long
run.
Efficiency effects: This is based on the idea that "when uncertainty in the
application of a legal standard exists, parties will either overcomply or
undercomply with the legal standard, modifying their behavior more than or less
than the law requires". 99 Regarding patent rights, overcomplying means potential
competitors choosing not to design around a particular patent so that its owner
gains more market power than that which is optimally desired. On the other hand,
undercomplying means potential competitors choosing to infringe a particular
patent instead of negotiating a license or assignment, which diminishes the value
of the patent protection damaging the function of patents as incentives to
produce, disclose and commercialize innovative activity. These inefficient
outcomes of parties over or undercomply with patent standards is to be treated in
Section five in more detail.
It is important to note here that aside from those harmful effects on global
innovative activity, the goals of promoting certainty and consistency of judgments
to encourage international transactions are significantly damaged by forum
shopping. If such a system is to increase the transaction costs for parties to
engage in that sort of business, a system to consolidate patent disputes with
such effects should be avoided at all. Otherwise the public confidence in the
system, as well as its sense of fairness, will disappear.
That the choice of a forum in patent litigation is not a linear equation depending
just on the role of the promoter of the action is even true for the U.S., where the
creation of the Federal Circuit might reduce the uncertainty about the applicable
patent law in similar cases. 100 Thus, bearing in mind that any generalization
about how the allocation of jurisdiction among asymmetric countries influence the
pay off of each interested actor is a complex task, any proposal of such a system
should be designed carefully.
However, there may be partial solutions helping to reduce, at least to some
extent, some of the incentives for plaintiffs to select pro-patentee forums that
award large sums of damages. 10 1 As long as different domestic systems are
interconnected by public and private international law, the free flow of decision
has an ultimate filter: the enforcement of rights and the provision of remedies as,
at maximum, it would been determined in the court addressed, or in the patent
office in the hypothesis that part of the remedy is the cancellation of the patent.
99 See Francesco Parisi and Kimberly A. Moore, supra, note 75, at 6.

100 It has been recognized that even within the U.S. the outcome in patent litigation is very volatile
without being related to any strict factors, see Kimberly A. Moore, supra, note 98.
101 Other proposed solutions such as the use of specialized courts and reducing the venues
(available jurisdictions) to adjudicate patent cases, seems to be at odds with any proposal
extending the enforcement of patents worldwide. See Kimberly A. Moore, supra, note 98.

Given the U.S. tradition allowing punitive damages as well as the inclusion of
broader items to determine compensatory damages, not only other DCs such as
the EU but most importantly LDCs 10 2 may find it unreasonable to fully enforce
those decisions containing exorbitant damages.
It is possible to find similar devices within legal instruments such as TRIPs 10 3 and
NEW YORK CONVENTION. 1 °4 Regarding the 1999 Draft, its Article 25(1) obliges
an addressed court to enforce a foreign judgment under the exceptions
established in article 28, particularly clause (f) that provides for the "recognition
or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the
State addressed" as a ground to deny enforcement.
Similarly article 15 of the 2003 proposal 0 5 creates a device to compensate the
potential private benefits derived from forum shopping if a plaintiff seeks to
102

The next are examples of Latin-American countries. Damage awards in Mexico are no less

than 40 percent of the public selling price of the infringing products or services according to
Mexican Industrial Property Law Article 221 bis. Moreover, there is no statutory provision to
increase the award if there is willful infringement on regarding the possibility for the winner party
to recover its attorney fees. In Argentina, damages might include moral damages if the infringer
device "provokes a loss of prestige of some, due to either a defective production of the invention
or to an inappropriate presentation of same". Even more, it is open to discussion whether legal
entities i.e.: corporation might be awarded with such relief, see Carlos Octavio Mitelman,
Responsibility for damages derived from non-compliance with trademarks and patents, available
at http://www.obligado.com.ar/ingarticulostrademarks.asp). In Brazil, article 44 paragraphs 3, of
the Patent Law limits the damages award to the contents of subject matter encompassed within
the claims.
103
104

See TRIPs article 45 (1).
See article V (2) providing that "Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be

refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country".
105 See Work. Doc. No 11 E by the Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (21 to 27 April 2004), Article
15 Damages: "1. A judgment which awards non-compensatory damages, including exemplary or
punitive damages, shall be recognized and enforced to the extent that a court in the requested
State could have awarded similar or comparable damages. Nothing in this paragraph shall
preclude the court addressed from recognizing and enforcing the judgment under its law for an
amount up to the full amount of the damages awarded by the court of origin" and article 15 "2. B

benefits from a foreign jurisdiction which usually grants larger damages than the
addressed courts. This situation already exists between DCs and LDCs so such
a mechanism is of great importance.
Overall, I think that the limit for enforcing foreign decision awarding large amount
of damages is an appropriate tool to equilibrate substantial differences in
domestic patent law, which
in turn reduces the transfer of wealth between
106
asymmetric countries.
g) Changing the rules may affect rational expectations of investors in IP.
In the case of countries and regions where most investors in intangible assets
are located, such as the U.S., the EU and Japan, allowing the court of those
countries to decide validity and, to a lesser extent, infringement in cases
involving foreign patents, 'particularly if they were granted in developed ones,
may have adverse consequences in the expected rate of returns as assessed
when the investment was made.
This effects may be even greater also those who invest in financial markets
providing the funds for innovative-risk activity if patent rights are to have a
measurable and socially desirable signaling function in those markets. 10 7 Were
this to happen, certainty and predictability for financial markets would become
other hallmark goals therein.10 8
In no event shall the court addressed recognize or enforce the judgment for an amount less than
that which could have been awarded in the requested State in the same circumstances, including
those existing in the State of origin".
106 A contrary vision regarding the use of such a cap system is taken by John Gladstone Mills Ill,

supra, note 28, at 18. On the other hand, the positive view is also sustained by Arthur T. Von
Mehren, Drafting a convention on international jurisdiction and the effects of foreign judgments
acceptable worldwide: Can the Hague Conference project succeed?, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 191-202
(2001), at 3.
107

See Clarisa Long, Patent signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002), ("Rather than focusing on

patents as a mechanism for privatizing information, I will instead frame patents as a means of
credibly publicizing information), at 627. I will not go deeper into this issue, however, it may be
helpful to analyze whether that signaling function of patents can be better regulated through
trademark law than through patent law, as the former has been particularly applied to protect the
creation of reputation, which informs not only consumers but also investors about the quality of
those intangible assets protected by a trademark right.
108 Also this interconnection between financial and patent provisions may lead to unilaterally
apply
US securities law overseas in order to protect patent-financial-investments, which for of all the
foregoing is not very likely to help develop a sustainable system for enforcing and recognizing
cross border patent disputes.

For example one of the top patent practitioners in Chicago whose view can be
considered to fairly represent the majority opinion of the US patent bar, says: "I
am not sure how US firms would react to the proposal that one court (e.g., in the
US or in Germany) could decide the fate of all corresponding patents issued by a
number of different countries. Certainly there would be more efficiency and lower
cost, and the prospect of being able to use a US court would be attractive to
most US firms. Still, not all corresponding patents truly have similar claims, and
the prospect of putting the entire portfolio of patents in the hands of a single
judge and/or jury might cause apprehension".' °9
This statement reflects a clear concern within most patent bars of developed-net
exporters of intangible assets countries about the potential costs of global
enforcement in terms of certainty. 110 However, the ongoing globalization of
markets and the growing dependence of developed countries on intangible
rights 1 ' might make it inevitable for those countries to face these sorts of risks,
so that this matter may bring further tensions between private rational
expectations versus policy regulating private property. It would be another issue
to analyze how much of those private rational expectations deserve legal
protection or not.' 2 Let us just say that if the protection of some domestic
financial market were to become an explicit major concern of the international
patent system one would wonder why the U.S. government proposed and still
maintains an interest in promoting international patent litigation.
PART FOUR: USING A MULTINATINAL TREATY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION
FOR RECOGNTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Having seen the major pros and cons for cross border litigation, I shall describe
and analyze the legal instruments developed by national officials in the Hague
Conference covering patent matters.
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Professor Brad Hulbert is a partner with McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff and he is also

co-director of Chicago-Kent's Program in Intellectual Property Law.
110 See report special committee Q 153, supra, note 5.
111 As reflected in the last numbers describing the National Current Account of the U.S., which
depicts the data of different sectors conducting international trade.
112 It may be interesting to analyze whether those interests could be protected under the current
international patent system. A starting point is the Canada-EU case, Doc. WT/DS224/R WTO
Dispute Settlement Panel, March 17, 2000, where it was stated that legitimate interests ("must be
defined in the way that it is often used in legal discourse-as a normative claim calling for
protection of interest that are "justifiable" in the sense that they are supported by the relevant
public policies or other social norms").

4.1) The 1999 Preliminary Draft from the Hague Conference
allocation of jurisdiction.113

and its

As a result of U.S. concerns,1 14 The Hague Conference on Private International
Law115 started working towards an agreement1 1to
enforce foreign judgments in
6
civil and commercial matters in the early 1990s.
In October 1999 the Special Commission adopted a Preliminary Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, which
since then has been pending (of doubtful) approval.
This legal piece covered most of the civil and commercial fields to be litigated by
private parties, including IPR. Its wide scope and the inclusion
of such a debated
17
delay.
its
for
reason
important
an
been
issue as IPR has
113

Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial

Matters, adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999, available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html, (hereinafter 1999 Draft)
114 Masato Dogauchi, Jurisdiction over Foreign Patent Infringement under the Hague Draft
Convention as of June 2001, WIPO Doc., WIPO/PIL/01/8, ("The concerns of the U.S. were, in
addition to securing having their judgments smoothly recognized and enforced in foreign
countries, to limit the application of exorbitant rules on jurisdiction of other countries. Especially, it
was of great interest for the U.S. to protect American parties from enforcement of judgments,
which was based on such exorbitant bases of jurisdiction as the location of the defendant's asset
found in German law or the nationality of the plaintiffs in French law")
http://www.softic.or.lp/symposium/open materials/iOth/en/docqauchil-en.pdf (last visited April
2004). Others, such as Von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A new
approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEM PROBS (1994), said that ("The
Hague Conference was chosen by the US .... because the US did not want to face the group of
contracting states to the European Conventions alone"), at 271-273.
15Members

of the Hague Conference include all EU countries as well as Argentina, Australia,

Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia,
Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Suriname,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. It should be noted
the most important economies of America are participating in the Convention.
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process
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It was based on the European model composed by the Brussels and Lugano
Convention as well as on the U.S. jurisdictional model. Its most important
function was to achieve consolidation of disputes through an array of instruments
shaping the allocation of jurisdiction among different domestic courts such as the
inclusion of a multiple defendant provision and litis pendens regulation with a
black, white and gray list of jurisdictions.
As a preliminary issue, any legal instrument like this can face the allocation of
jurisdiction for international litigation of patent rights in three ways: First, leave it
without the content of the agreement," second, posit the exclusive jurisdiction
on the granting state, 119 or third, allocate it between the granting state and other
states in a manner stated in an international agreement. As the first and second
solutions would not add anything new to the current situation I shall concentrate
on the third. Before that, it is noteworthy to refer to the mixed feature of the
Convention, which had three sources for allocating jurisdiction:
a) "White List" of connecting factors empowering jurisdiction over a
signatory country of origin, which "shall" be recognized or enforced, by a
receiving signatory country.
b) "Gray List", the key element of a mixed convention, allowing a
signatory country of origin to decide, according to its domestic law, whether or
not to apply the international rules of jurisdiction. Therefore, the receiving
country also had the discretional basis to decide whether or not to
recognize/enforce a foreign judgment. This latter list was a victory for
common law judicial systems, relying mostly on broad discretion for judicial
authority1 2to
decide whether to hear or not a case as well as how to solve new
0
matters.
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The need to include more provisions covering new issues prompted by Internet was also a

reason to delay the 1999 Draft, see http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/ab25.html
(last visited April 2004)
118 That was the proposed solution Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg, supra, note 28.
119 This seems to be the position of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia and Japan,
see Masato Dogauchi, supra, note 114.
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Arthur T. Von Mehren, supra, note 106, at 4, stating the advantages of a mixed convention.

This is a hallmark issue for the whole Proposed Draft as it distinguishes the different tradition to
allocate jurisdiction between common and civil law countries. The common law tradition
establishes a set of flexible rules allowing judges to decide whether they should exercise it or not,
as forum non conveniens doctrine, while the second is designed to be mandatorally followed by
judges to exercise jurisdiction.

c) "Black List" prohibiting both the country of origin and receipt to apply them.

Article 12 of the 1999 Draft allocated jurisdiction through this mixed system as
follows:
"Article 12. Exclusive jurisdiction: (The white list grounds)
4. In proceedings which have as their object the registration, validity, [or] nullity[,
or revocation or infringement,] of patents, trade marks, designs or other similar
rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Contracting State
in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or,
under the terms of an international convention, is deemed to have taken place,
have exclusive jurisdiction. This shall not apply to copyright or any neighboring
rights, even though registration or deposit of such rights is possible.
(The gray area):
[5. In relation to proceedings that have as their object the infringement of patents,
the preceding paragraph does not exclude the jurisdiction of any other court
under the Convention or under the national law of a Contracting State.]
[6. The previous paragraphs shall not apply when the matters referred to therein
arise as incidental questions.]
Behind this drafted article there is more to be seen. During June 1999, the US
delegation sustained that exclusive jurisdiction over validity of IPR should not
impede "jurisdiction if validity is and incidental question in litigation". 121 The
proposal was rejected by a narrow vote due to the difficulties in applying foreign
IPR law and the apprehension about US courts interfering with the sovereignty of
other courts in registration issues, but it was finally drafted as paragraph 5 in the
1999 Draft.
After it was launched, further debates and discussion among delegations
regarding the allocation of jurisdiction for patent infringements arose in the
Conference meetings. Hence, an alternative number of proposals were made
involving different approaches to allocate exclusive jurisdiction in patent matters.
4.2) 2001 Proposal to allocate iurisdiction
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The Diplomatic Conference in June 2001
proposals for Article 12.123
121

concluded with three different

Cited in Blumer, Transatlantic Patent Litigation, at *392.

122 Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic

Conference 6 - 20 June 2001, available at http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm2001draft_e.doc
(hereinafter 2001 Proposal).

OPTION A) According to paragraph 4, the court of the state where the patent
was granted had exclusive jurisdiction on the issues of validity, invalidity and
infringement of that patent. Paragraph 6 states "Paragraphs 4.... shall not apply
where one of the above matters arises as an incidental question in proceedings
before a court not having exclusive jurisdiction under those paragraphs.
However, the ruling in that matter shall have not binding effect in subsequent
proceedings, even if they are between the same parties. A matter arises as an
incidental question if the court is not requested to give a judgment on that matter,
even if ruling on it is necessary in arriving at a decision".
OPTION B) Paragraph 4 set forth that the court of the state where the patent was
granted had exclusive jurisdiction on issues regarding validity but not on
infringement of the patents. Paragraph 5 allocated jurisdiction for infringement of
patents to those courts referred in paragraph 4 or according to the provisions of
Articles 3 to 16 i.e. general rules of jurisdiction such as defendant forum habitual
residence (ART 3), consent on jurisdiction between the parties (Art 4), when
defendant did not contest the jurisdiction (Art 5).
OPTION C) Under this proposal either i) all intellectual property matters were to
be excluded from the scope of the Convention, ii) only copyright matters were to
be included, or iii) only matters related to Internet were to be excluded.
4.3) Analyzing the proposed bases for jurisdiction.
The rationale behind article 12 of the 1999 and option B in the 2001 Proposal
were similar to the Brussels regulation separating actions about infringement of
patents from those about validity. As cited above, this is no a minor legal issue
and it is still pending in the European Court of Justice, which decision may make
the distinction between actions for infringement and validity of patents within the
European Community more or less significant for the debate within the Hague
Conference. If it decides the issue reinforcing the exclusive jurisdiction of the
registered state regarding validity of patents it will be a signal against the forces
leading towards a multinational system to litigate patent rights.
A more acute problem in the 1999 Draft was that paragraph 5 of article 12
granted jurisdiction to almost "any" court other than one of the registering state
rising the number of choices for patent owners to file an infringement action
increasing the expected return of forum shopping. This was so because the
provisions allowing a court to exercise jurisdiction were based on multiple legal
standards such as: the place where a defendant resides (article 3 and article 9
extending jurisdiction to the operative place of a branch); and the place of injury
(art. 10).
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This summary is based on Yoshio Kamadura, International Patent Litigation and Jurisdiction,

Study of Hypothetical Question I Under the Hague Draft Convention and Japanese Laws,
available at http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/openmaterials/1 Oth/en/kumakura-en. pdf, last
visited March 2004.

It is also important to take into account that this Draft contained provisions
allowing courts from states other than the registering state to order provisional or
protective measures (art 13), which would increase private benefits for patent
owners stopping the entrance of potential competitors in almost any market. It
seems obvious that courts of LDCs would then have incentives to revise the
validity of those patents when required to enforce foreign provisional judgments,
which in turn would potentially affect patent holders if the title (that might sustain
the validity of an entire portfolio) were to be declared invalid.
Having the possibility of revising article 12 under the European experience
referred above, it is safe to conclude that the amount of global litigation over how
to deal with validity and infringement in different courts would be troublesome.
The same would happen over what is an incidental question in option A of the
2001 Proposal, paragraph 6.
Option B in the 2001 Proposal seems to be the one preferred by US officials,
although it faces the challenges of other countries adhering to the "act of the
state doctrine" as well as the patent bars of developed countries.
There is also the option of giving only "inter partes" effect to decision ruling the
invalidity of foreign patents, as set forth in option A of the 2001 Proposal
regarding incidental questions. This is an interesting shortcut to deal with the
problem of allocating jurisdiction, although it is not a definitive solution, as there
are other issues challenging the 1999 Draft and 2001 Proposal.
4.4) Public international law analysis: why patents are so problematic as to
be included in an agreement such as the 1999 Draft and 2001 Proposal.124
A) International lawmaking costs:
Let us recall that there are many LDCs among the countries participating in
designing a convention. Current disputes regarding the regulation and
implementation of minimum standards of patents according to TRIPS 125 involving
those countries are well known. Moreover, there are many signals that the extent
of substantive harmonization may be conducted through bilateral and regional
agreements rather than multilateral treaties, which may raise more complexities
for the international patent system. 126

124 The reasons for the delay to adopt the proposals go beyond patent issues. However, I would

rather concentrate on the problematic issues arisen by factors connected with patent rights.
125 Let us recall that most of the LDCs are still not required to fully implement the international
obligations assumed under the TRIPs, due to the grace period given to those countries.
126 The use of bilateral treaties to regulate intellectual property rights is likely to speed up in the
short term. For instance most of the treaties cited supra, note 16, were signed during the last 2
years.

Because patent regulation is so unstable given its relation to international trade
and also has considerable implications for domestic policies of LDCs such as
public health and economic development, 127 until most of these issues are
clarified, in my opinion the current stage of international harmonization of
substantive patent law will not allow us to set forth a solid base for developing a
general model establishing international patent litigation such as the 1999 Draft
or the 2001 Proposal.
Otherwise the overlapping process of substantive international harmonization
and the extension of international enforcement of patents may generate further
clashes among countries with opposite interest for dealing with regulation of
innovative activity 128.
Thus, even if a private international law convention were to be launched today,
the growing process of multilateral and regional integration may impose the
challenge of how to coordinate supranational (TRIPs) and regional or bilateral
agreements at a stage where neither one is already consolidated. This is not only
127

There is a wide range of interests that LDCs may try to add to future issues into the process of

substantive patent harmonization, including the aim of having MNEs internalized the use of those
resources abundantly found in LDCs. For example, ("several proposals have been made,
particularly by IPRs-concerned NGOs, for the revision of article 27.3.b, for instance, in order to
ensure that naturally occurring materials are not patentable, and to recognize some form of
protection for the "traditional knowledge" of local and indigenous communities") Carlos Correa,
supra, note 21. Moreover, there are some overlapping competences of multilateral agencies
working on areas that may affect any outcome of that broad process of harmonization. Regarding
the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), ("the African Group has indicated, in particular, that art.
27.3.b of TRIPs should be harmonized with the CBD, the objective of which is to protect the rights
of indigenous people and local farming communities and to protect and promote biological
diversity"), id. For instance, ("India has noted that while the TRIPS Agreement obliges Members
to provide product patents for microorganisms and for non-biological and microbiological
processes, and to provide for the protection of plant varieties, the CBD "categorically reaffirms
that nation states have sovereign rights over their own biological resources, recognizes the
desirability of sharing equitably the benefits arising from the use of these resources as well as
traditional knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the conservation of biological
diversity and its sustainable use, and acknowledges that special provisions are required to meet
the needs of developing countries"), ib.
128 Future industrial developments such as Nanotechnology may increase
the importance of
innovative activity as a geopolitical key for its potential commercial and social value not only for
DCs but also for LDCs.

true for the EU systems based on the Lugano - Brussels Convention 129 but also
for the coming FTAA including NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CARICOM (Caribbean
Community), ANDEAN COMMUNITY, that is, for the whole of America.
Besides these political concerns affecting the lawmaking process of international
law there is the majority rule governing the potential outcomes form the Hague
Conference. As long as each country has a single vote and a majority is required
to agree on a draft to become an official proposal there may be imbalances
during the negotiations. Likewise the lawmaking process is also distorted within
the Hague Conference for all proposals made by any country have to be
accepted and discussed by the rest of the members, so that the longer it takes to
study such a complex issue as international patent litigation, the less clear the
test.1 3 0 According to U.S. officials "the project as currently embodied in the
October 1999 preliminary
draft conventions stands no chance of being accepted
131
States".
United
the
in
Overall, the main issue for the Hague Conference to solve is how to overcome
the existence of the asymmetric views and interest regarding substantive
regulation of patents rights among its member countries.
b) Increasing forum shopping reinforces asymmetric
regulating patent rights.

interests on

Given the lawmaking costs to launch a tight agreement setting stable bases for
jurisdiction a logical consequence would be a lack of uniformity and certainty in
the cross border enforcement of patents. Indeed this would lead to grant potential
plaintiffs, through the extension of available potential jurisdictions, and
defendants, through the potential use of declaratory judgments, with a broader
set of choices increasing forum shopping, which results in the harmful practices
that were already described above.
Because of all these factors, it is reasonable to believe that the ongoing and
predicted tensions on the implementation of international agreements by LDCs
such as the TRIPs, but particularly with the called TRIPs-Plus, may also prevent
a successful development of the132
"third stage" of the "international patent system"
in connection to those countries.
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Arthur T. Von Mehren, supra, note 106, at 6.
130 It has been noted that "in comparison with the 1999 draft articles which consisted of 12,000
words, the 2001 draft articles consists of 24,000 words", Masato Dogauchi, supra, note 114.
131 Letter of February 22, 2000, Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser and Head of U.S.
Delegation, to J.H.A. von Loon, Secretary General of the Conference.
132 However, the existence of overlapping multiple factors motivating developing countries to
update and increase the level of substantive and effective patent protection, for example
regarding traditional knowledge in the Andean Community, makes difficult any final prediction.
Current negotiations over agricultural subsidies may also have a great impact on the willingness

To conclude, I think that neither the 1999 Draft nor the 2001 Proposal had the
required solid basis for most member countries to agree on the design of an
optimal system regulating the allocation of jurisdiction capable of prevailing in the
medium term. 133
134
4.5. The 2003 Proposal

The ongoing work under the Hague Conference over transnational patent
litigation is focusing on the enforcement of exclusive choice of court clauses
included in contracts between commercial parties, or business-to-business
transactions. 135 As I will address in more detail in the next section, I think this is
the best available strategy to establish an optimal system to enforce domestic
patent rights across borders. However, the current draft agreement does not
expressly includes infringement nor validity of patents, 136 although it might do so
if it arises as an incidental questions, 137 which is better than nothing but
inadequate given the current stage of the international patent system and the
potential benefits to be gained therefrom.
Thus the current proposal seems to absolutely reject the previous work made
under the 1999 Draft and the 2001 Proposal, and only a cloak of international
ongoing negotiations over intellectual property in general may explain the reason
to doubt the inclusion of infringement and reject validity of patents therein. Even if
the issue of determining the validity of a patent in a court other than from the
registered state is problematic, there may be higher social benefits than costs for
both private entities doing business and other interested actors if B2B
transactions involving patent rights are to be included therein.

of LDCs to adopt higher standards of IPR protection, as they will access to new markets for their
products in DCs.
133 Although it is an analysis beyond the scope of this paper, it may be beneficial here to apply the
new developments in the theory of international law, such as the dynamic theory of international
law worked out by Brett Frischmann, supra, note 34, and other scholars.
134 See Draft on exclusive choice of court agreements of April 2004, working paper no. 110
E, at
http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-wdl 10_e.pdf. This and prior similar documents such as the
Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Draft Report, drawn up
by Masato Dogauchi and Trevor C. Hartley (hereinafter "Dogauchi Report"), together will be
called the 2003 Proposal.
135 Hereinafter B2B, the proposal is not to include consumer contracts.
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See article 2.2 (k) and the comments in Dogauchi Report, section 29, at 11.
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See article 2.3 and Dogauchi Report, supra, note 136.

Notwithstanding the 138
foregoing, it is very likely that patent disputes are not going
all.
at
included
be
to
In the next Section I shall offer a normative rationale to justify the inclusion of
international patent litigation within the 2003 Proposal.
SECTION 5): A POTENTIAL RATIONALE TO ALLOCATE JURISDICTION
OVER INTERNATIONAL PATENT CASES
As I have pointed out throughout this paper, the major discussion regarding
international patent litigation has been whether or not to extend jurisdiction over
patent validity to courts of countries other than that of the registering state. This
is the argument that arises most of the time as a defense against infringement
actions where such defense is allowed. 139 Likewise, most of the apprehension
with the 1999 Draft and 2001 Proposal is derived from the uncertainty and
complexity that such a provision would mean for current global innovative
activity. 14Without dismissing the difficulties that such issues are to impose in a
future model, I think that there are some shortcuts to deal with most of those
concerns.
My starting point is to recognize that there are social advantages from having
different (higher-low) patent protection and/or from applying international
standards of patent protection according to their domestic interpretation when the
subject is not constrained by prior binding decisions and declarations of
international agencies such as WTO and WIPO managing international patent
treaties and shaping new ones. I also recognize that such a soft principle of
territoriality also has disadvantages for private parties wishing to enter into
transactions for they bear the uncertainty regarding the extension of their rights
and obligations when operating across borders. However, I think that it is still
possible to reach a better relative solution allowing private parties to set forth
their business objectives with some more legal certainty. That is why I will
138This proves the importance of ongoing claims in favor of keeping the act of state doctrine
which was analyzed above, see Dogauchi Report at 11. Professor Dinwoodie believes that the
exclusion of patent right matters is to be the final result of the current discussion within the Hague
Conference.
Not all domestic patent systems provide this solution, see Special Committee Q 153, supra
note 5, where it is set forth that some countries allow a defendant to rise the defense of invalidity
139

of the patent while others require filing a different action before the Patent Office or a Court.
140

See AIPPI International Report of Special Committee Q175, "On The Envisaged Hague

Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters", available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html, citing the different options regarding the allocation of
exclusive jurisdiction on the registering state, among its member countries, which is included in
article 12 (4) 1999 Draft.

dedicate this Section to show that the 2003 Proposal and the ongoing
developments of international arbitration start to indicate that a major difference
may have to be drawn between cases involving related and unrelated parties
from countries with symmetric or asymmetric incentives in order to allow a court
from a state other than the registering state to decide over validity of foreign
patents. These distinctions are based on two assumptions to make the
international patent system more efficient.
ASSUMPTION ONE.
The first assumption is that private market actors are more interested in reaching
successful transactions, which serves the socially desirable goal of promoting
international commerce of innovative activities, rather than in merely entering in
litigation for private benefits, which is socially desirable as a second best choice
to solve disputes arising from the said commerce. Hence, the choice of whether
to litigate or not is (optimally) a consequence of the capability to foresee
disagreements between the parties. Therefore the first stage of any international
agreement regulating cross border patent litigation should be directed towards
creating a mechanism for solving disputes among related parties who are going
to litigate as a second best choice as long as they would have preferred to
achieve an agreement but transaction costs or unforeseeable events prevented
them from doing so. In short, an international patent141system should promote
private parties to negotiate efficiently among them.
Despite these considerations the initial models of treaties were centered on
developing a consolidation system without further reference to whether the
connection between the parties on litigation should be taken into account. The
rationale for such a distinction is that in order to extend the allocation of
jurisdiction over infringement and/or validity of patents to countries other than the
registering state, current uncertainties and dynamics of the international patent
system should be taken into account. As stated above, the process of
international harmonization has not meant the abolishment of concurrent
domestic patent laws setting high protection in net IP exporters countries and low
protection in net importers. Even if the patent system of net importer countries
fully implement the international minimum standards of TRIPs or future higher
levels of protection, still there will be space for their courts or legislatures to apply
and/or enact protectionist measures without discriminating among national and
foreigners thus not violating the national treatment principle. Due to these
141

Of course there may be limits for that freedom to negotiate founded on the "public interest" of

member countries. For example: regulation of transfer of technology for national security
purposes, antitrust or anticompetitive law to avoid such harmful practices, allocation of jurisdiction
to tax international transactions of intangible assets in order to combat tax avoidance by transfer
pricing methods. Likewise it should be carefully noted that certain IP regulations have been left up
to each country such as exhaustion of patent rights (article 6 of TRIPs) and antitrust regulation of
IP.

characteristics of the international patent system, models such as the 1999 Draft
or the 2001 Proposal would increase the costs of private parties looking to enter
a business transaction for the uncertainty about how those rights are to be
enforced in the future, which ultimately rebounds in the prices, amount or quality
of the inventions used by producers and enjoyed by consumers.
Thus, a central term to analyze is "related parties", meaning sufficient connecting
factors between the parties of a dispute as a first step to justify a potential
jurisdiction, and only then between each party and the potential jurisdictions.
"Related parties" could mean parties of a contract regarding the sale, transfer,
licensing, distribution or franchising of assets protected by patents; a previous
litigation on the same subject matter by the same parties in forums having similar
standards of patent protection as well as the existence of an agreement
regulating choice of forum or mandatory arbitration, if not others. 142 Limiting it up
to the existence of a B2B exclusive choice on court agreement may be a good
start in order to begin the path of cooperation among governments that may
influence the reshaping of a more efficient and fairer international patent system.
Focusing first on the existence of said contracts also has the benefit that it may
spur the transfer of already existing technology to countries that not only have
low standards of patent protection but also lack the required funds and/or
expertise to properly enforce already existing patent rights. After all, such a treaty
will give governments of LDCs the chance to follow a self-interested strategy and
join it hoping this would have at least a signaling effect attracting innovative
activities, which is a matter of domestic policy competence. If that instrument is
launched and works as desired, it will signal the advantages for other counties to
do so, improving the efficiency of the current international patent system. 143
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I doubt that the European standard (spiders and webs) applied in Expandable Grafts P'Ship v.

Boston Scientific, supra, note 39, could be properly included herein, for the basic rationale on that
case was article 6 (1) of Brussels Convention, which has the goal of avoid irreconcilable
judgments within the EU. However, in dicta it was made the exception where there are several
companies belonging to one same group, which can be work out to suit in the said "relatedness
rationale".
143 In order for LDCs to raise their level of development, it has been recognized that they will
need
to have access to technology that either makes the production of existing products cheaper, or
results in new products awarding a comparative advantage to compete in the global market
place. That can be done essentially in two ways, through their own efforts on R&D or through the
transfer of technology that has already been produced in other, generally developed, countries.
Given the financial constraints that most LDCs face regarding the first approach, I think is useful
to concentrate on exploring alternatives that may facilitate the second strategy, which would also
save global scare resources for avoiding duplicative costs of R&D.

ASSUMPTION TWO.
The second assumption to prefer the 2003 rather than the 1999 Draft or the 2001
Proposal is derived from a rationalization of patent infringement as torts. 144 Once
again the economic analysis of the law provides us with helpful insights about
this legal institution.14 5 Under said approach, the aim of patent infringement is to
deter potential infringers from affecting the legitimate rights of the patent
owner, 146 if and only if the latter complies with the legal requirements of
patentability including disclosing the required information during the prosecution
of a patent application and monitoring its rights once granted. Once litigation has
begun the goal to achieve is enforcing the right to exclude awarded through the
patent title while at the same time taking into account "the interest of third
parties". 147 This rationale may allow domestic courts to work out and to
implement the international principles of article 7 of TRIPs, which have been
applied, for example, in the Canada-EU case. 148 Taken as a tort, the ultimate
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Janice M. Mueller, supra, note 10 ("Patent litigation is a tort, for which the patent owner may

sue an accused infringer in a civil action"), at 307 also citing Carbice Corp v. American Patents
Dev. Corp, 283 US27, 32 (1931) ("Infringement ....whether direct or contributory, is essentially a
tort, and implies invasion of some right of the patentee"). This seems to be the right rationale if we
take into account those international agreements stating primarily compensatory but not punitive
damages.
145 For a general analysis of this topic, see Tomas Ulen, supra, note 8
146

The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel in the Canada-UE, supra, note 112, held that ("The

exclusive rights conferred by a patent were normally exploited by "working" the patent for
commercial gain. Typically, this would involve the patentee engaging in any combination of the
following activities: using the patent to manufacture and sell the product as a monopolist,
licensing the right to use the invention to others in return for the payment of royalty or other
compensation; and selling a part or the whole of its property right in the invention and its patent").
147 Defined as ("all those who, not having a property interest in the patent, had
an interest in the
availability, consumption, cost or production or regulated products that were subject to the
protection of a patent. Thus "third parties" included society at large, individual and institutional
consumers of such regulated products and would-be competitors producers of those products"),
Canada case, id.
148 ("The TRIPs Agreement as a whole was framed so as to achieve a balance
between
competing interests, and to ensure that the assertion of patent rights did not prevent the
realization of other important societal objectives"), Canada case, id.

function 149 of a patent legal system is to impose optimal costs on potential
infringers to deter them from doing so while at the same time allowing them to
engage in the optimal amount of inventing-around-activities, which brings the
optimal level of innovation to the market. 150 The particular dilemma of patent
infringement under a tort rationale is that while a legal system must confer
protection to patent owners, on the other hand a society should avoid the
restriction to legitimate uses of valuable innovation which in turn depends on
cumulative exploration and use of prior knowledge i.e. "designing around a
patent". 151 This problem is particularly acute for those LDCs with an economic
and social infrastructure to enter and efficiently compete in the global market
such as India, China, Brazil and Argentina.
However, the proper balance between the social benefits and costs of this
universal patent dilemma is not evenly achieved in those different sorts of
countries. LDCs face challenges such as lack of qualitative information i.e.
optimal control over the disclosure of the required information such as the best
mode to work a particular patent, because the production of innovative products
is mainly carried out in DCs. Moreover, most of them neither have the required
149

There are other rationalizations to describe, justify or guide a patent system. For example:

patents as a system to reward scarce activities (incentive to invent); to encourage those having
private information to disclose it to the public (incentive to disclose); and to coordinate the
commercialization of the output of R&D activity (incentive to innovate), there are also newer
theories such as those pointing out the relevance of patent to diminish transaction cost, see Paul
J. Held, A Transaction cost theory of Patent Law, available at
http:lwww.law.tulane.edu/WlPIP/papers/transcosttheory.pdf. This last theory is very helpful for
my analysis; however, I am assuming that patent systems should optimally operate globally under
a tort rationale, which founds a legal base on article 7 of TRIPs, and WTO cases, such as
Canada v. EU., supra, note 112.
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There is a tension between the notice function of claims, i.e. protecting actual or potential

competitors of the patentee, and a full protection of patent holders rights. See Roger D. Blair,
Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in Intellectual Property Law,
68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, *20 ("an important reason for having liability rules (in addition to preserving
the patentee's incentive to invent) is to deter patent infringement from occurring [FN77]. It is
socially useful to deter patent infringement because infringement is not socially productive,
although it could be privately profitable. Moreover, resources are wasted in protecting against
unauthorized use. Finally, if infringement is deterred patentees will, by necessity, receive
whatever compensation they are able to negotiate from those who wish to use the patent").
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That is the reason to grant patent rights, "patent of addition", for improvements over prior

inventions.

resources to gather and process the adequate (in terms of quality and quantity)
information during a prosecution of a patent application nor during an 152
infringement trial to finally reach an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.
Hence, departing from those assumptions I will focus on the more practical
issues of how by modifying the current international patent system the situation
of both private parties wishing to enter an international transaction and judicial
bodies wishing to reduce their dockets and expenditures, can be improved.
Let us assume that most domestic patent systems are based on primarily private
means 153 to enforce patents rights where the ultimate goal is to induce potential
infringers to negotiate a license rather than to infringe the patent rights if, and
only if, the patentee has complied with all the standards of patentability. Under an
optimal global enforcement system, if the "use" of a patented invention under
payment of a fee makes the potential infringer better off, he or she will prefer to
negotiate a license rather than to infringe the patent. In this ideal world private
parties are in charge of gathering and processing information to make that
decision. If it is more likely that a patent is to be declared invalid rather than valid,
a risk-neutral competitor will prefer to copy around said patent. Hence, it may be
expected that an optimal amount of inventions will be used in a given importing
foreign market as long as those risk-neutral potential infringers prefer to
negotiate the importation of the subject matter rather than copy around, which is
a risk activity if foreign patentees can sue them abroad. Currently, there are
problems for private parties operating in LDCs due to they do no have
access to the optimal amount and quality of information so that their
assessment regarding the probabilities of being infringing a patent is
152

For a brief explanation of the problems that LDCs, particularly Latin American countries, face

on this matter see Ignacio De Leon, The enforcement of competition policies on intellectual
property and its implications on economic development: The Latin American experience,
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and Canadian Bar Association Competition
Law Section, International Antitrust Conference, Vancouver, May 31 June 1, 2001, available at
SSRN website. This debate, however, is not isolated to LDCs. For an example about the US
regarding biotechnology see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the course in patenting genetic
material: A counterproposal to Richard Epstein's Steady Course, Perspectives on Properties of
the Human Genome Project, ( F. Scott Kieff, ed., 2003).
153 The imposition of costs to have a potential infringer internalized their potential
free riding can
be achieved by "primarily private means" or by "a mix of public and private actions". The former is
found in countries such as the US where the patent title confers to his owner a substantive-strong
and tightly-enforced right to sue others. The latter may be found in countries such as Mexico
where the infringement action, even if started by private notice, is lead by a public agency, I.M.P.I
in this particular case.

distorted because of the dissimilar application of standards of patent
protection by most of their courts.
Consolidating disputes among related parties in the forum of a net exporter
country that applies the law of a net importer country regarding the validity or/and
the infringement of a patent granted by the latter may assure the private party
located in the former an unbiased and technically proper issue decision, which
may surpass the poor protection afforded in the importing country where the
same rights may be rejected therein or, at least, limited to some extent. This last
practices are currently likely to escape from existing international obligations
such as national treatment. The fact that the decision may be unbiased, or at
least less biased than if it continue always to be dictated by a court of the
importing country, may be a win-win situation if some sort of revision by the
enforcing country is also to be necessary. This need of cooperation between the
seized and the addressed court may counter unilateral-self-interested measures
damaging private parties from any of those countries, at least if one analyzes the
potential outcomes in the medium or long term. Furthermore, courts dictating
biased decision may lose prestige so that the same or other parties of future
transaction could anticipate the consequences of selecting those "biased"
forums, a measurable risk capable of being borne for a price in a contract.
Finally, the scope of protection should be based on the substantive law of the
registering state, including the amount of remedies afforded in the net importer
country. Assuring this is to be the function of such a "filter" as the cap on damage
awards stated above.
Another advantage of such a system is that the resources wasted by patent
owners for controlling and monitoring the activities of potential infringers in other
countries may be used in more social beneficial activities or, if it accounts as a
cost of the business transaction, may be deducted thus decreasing the cost of
licensing inventions to net importer countries. 154 Taking into account these
potential benefits, a major function of any international private law system for
enforcing patent rights worldwide should be to reduce current costs derived from
the existence of asymmetric incentives in order to allow private parties to
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("The very sharing of intellectual property rights across borders raises a risk that proprietary

control of the technology may be lost or, at a minimum, that a competitor will be created. For
those reasons, international licensing agreements are complex legal documents that need to be
carefully negotiated and drafted. Absent licensed transfers, piracy of intellectual proprietary is
increasingly commonplace. Indeed, in some developing countries such theft has risen to the
height of development strategy"), Ralph H. Folsom and others, supra, note 11, at 730.

negotiate first and to litigate if there is not another choice, later. 155 Moreover,
allowing the parties to set forth the desired forum, which does not determine the
substantive law, may narrow ex-ante the potential overlapping jurisdictions thus
reducing the harmful effects of forum shopping.
Hence, an optimal first stage of such a system containing members with
asymmetric incentives to regulate and enforce patent rights should not primarily
focus on allocating jurisdiction for suing an unrelated party such as an unnoticed
competitor who may be infringing a patent owned by a foreign entity having
multiple foreign patent counterparts as proposed in the 1999 Draft system.
Focusing on the negative effects for innovative activity in the net importer
country, we should consider that a potential free rider may not have handy
information to know whether the invention disclosed in his or her country is
already patented in some other more pro-patentee country whose jurisdiction
could be used by a potential plaintiff to sue under a general system such as the
1999 Draft. In the case of unrelated parties from net importer countries and net
exporter countries, it seems to be clearly problematic to allow any of their courts
to adjudicate a dispute over the infringement and validity of foreign patents. The
main issues are not only the general "costs" that were pointed out above but also
the uncertainties that would be brought if what a potential infringer can do were
to be decided by a court of a net exporter country with incentives to find an
extended liability of the would-be infringer as well as few reasons to declare the
invalidity of the patents. The same would happen if the entire portfolio of patents
owned by a foreign entity were decided by the court of a net importer country,
which at the very least would have incentives to negatively assert the
infringement of a domestic patent, if not to declare the invalidity of the entire
portfolio putting the invention within the public domain in multiple jurisdictions.
Such general system could be optimally implemented to regulate private
transactions among unrelated parties from net exporter countries for the
undesirable effects of forum shopping are less important. For example, a dispute
involving unrelated national entities of U.S. and Europe could avoid the problem
of existing asymmetric incentives due to the lack of potential transfer of national
wealth between those countries. This is based on the probability that the amount
of imported and exported patentable goods and intangible assets in each of
15

Which was called "contractualization of torts" by Jonathan A. Franklin and Roberta J. Morris,

International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in the era of global networks: irrelevance
or, goals for, and comments on the current proposals, 77 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 1213. Private
negotiation is also a desirable goal for any patent system in order to create and sustain efficient
market prices regarding the creation and use of intangible assets. Stating the difficulties for
private parties to find the fair market value in licensing agreements see Gavin Clarkson, Avoiding
Suboptimal Behavior in Intellectual Asset Transactions: Economic and Organizational
Perspectives on the sale of knowledge, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH 711, (2001).

these countries would be offset giving as a result a near-zero sum of net wealth
transferred for the whole transactions occurring between parties from those
countries. Moreover, harmful efficiency effects of forum shopping might also
rebound to a lesser extent on those countries, as their patent systems are both
based on "high standards" of patent protection. Were such a system to be in the
benefit of those countries, it could be implemented through bilateral treaties
without the law-making problems that have delayed adoption of the 1999 Draft.
However, due to other important legal
differences between their systems, such a
15 6
further.
studied
be
should
system
Summing up, due to the current asymmetric 157 incentives to regulate domestic
patent system in a large number of countries, an optimal first stage of a more
global patent system should not focus on allocating jurisdiction for suing an
unrelated party such as an unnoticed competitor who may be infringing a foreign
patent for that might increase the costs of those activities, making all the parties
worse off. Thus, allocating jurisdiction to a country other than the registering
country over disputes among unrelated parties would impose potential costs on
the innovative players for their apprehension to be sued by a foreign plaintiff as
long as the latter is given more flexible choices for jurisdiction increasing his or
her expected litigation rate of return. These are all well founded concerns
described as harmful effects of forum shopping in international patent cases.
Finally, the following should be inferred in cases where litigation involves related
parties: potential private and public costs damaging the transfer and global
production of innovative activity are not overwhelmingly present, as the parties
are to be able to evaluate most of these problems before entering the transaction
in their benefit.
Some hypothetical examples using more concrete players may provide us with
better insights:
Scenario 1:

156 Among

the most important differences in need of being coordinated, it can be found: the

coordination of systems based on first to invent and first to file as well as the different criteria i.e.
central and peripheral approaches, to interpret claims in infringement actions.
157

As another example of these asymmetries, the regulation of exceptions of patent infringement

shows the relative difference about the social value of competitive innovation between net
exporter and importer countries. For example the scope of the fair use doctrine as a valid defense
for infringement varies in countries like the U.S. that gives it little scope while others, especially
LDCs with higher relative value for competing activity, give that defense broader scope.

USCOM is158 a U.S. company and it has a patent for product X in the US and
Brazil. X has great potential value in both markets. BRACOM is a Brazilian firm
that markets a product W which is very similar to X in the sense that it could be
found either identical or not quite similar to infringe X with the same probabilities.
Furthermore, W has a very similar market value to X and USCOM and BRACOM
are competitors in Brazil but have no relation each other.
Under the rationale stated above USCOM should not be able to sue BRACOM in
the U.S. alleging that W infringes the patent for X either under U.S. or Brazilian
law.
There are plenty of reasons to reach this conclusion in the present practice under
the "international patent system". The first is the lack of personal jurisdiction for
U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction but there are also the "costs" of enforcing
patent rights globally such as language barriers, disavowing foreign law as well
as bias of national decisions favoring the nationals of the court, to be endured
without any clear advantage.
Hence, without the establishment of a system to consolidate overlapping
jurisdictions, BRACOM is likely to allege that the Brazilian patent for X is not valid
so that the next question is whether a US court should still decide the issue of
infringement instead of a Brazilian one. The answer seems to be clearly negative
for in the absence of such a treaty a Brazilian court would be tempted to review
the merits of the case according to its own domestic law and procedures under
the principles of independence of patents and territoriality. Because a Brazilian
court would reject the jurisdiction of the US court and dismiss any potential
judgment, were a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction it would not only increase
litigation costs159
but also damage alternative methods towards consolidating
cases.
patent
Moreover, given the significant differences between US and Brazilian patent
law, 160 it is possible that a U.S. decision, proper in terms of technical capacity as

158

A US company means that USCOM is a US resident, whatever the definition of such a

concept is to be used for purposes of exercising jurisdiction as incorporated company, subsidiary,
branch, permanent establishment, etc. The legal standard of residency has been a major
connecting factor in order to assume jurisdiction in most legal fields of international transactions.
However, under the current stage of globalization it is obvious that such a concept should be
worked out to cover the greater mobility of legal entities around the globe.
159 For instance the use of alternative ways for U.S. parties to enforce their rights would soar, such
as private lobby for the unilateral extraterritorial application of U.S. law, which was stated as one
of the costs to avoid a system to consolidate overlapping jurisdictions
160 Among these differences, there are some specific provisions to take into account. For example
article 68 of 1996 Brazilian Industrial Property Law establishes a local working requirement, which
caused the US to file a request for a WTO panel (WT/DS199/3, Jan. 9, 2000). The case was

well as its legal adherence to Brazilian law, might be deemed to be the
importation of a monopoly into Brazil. This last remark should be particularly
taken into account when dealing with asymmetric countries i.e.: a net exporter
and a net importer of intangible assets, where the existence of either "judicial
mistakes" of inexperienced judges in Brazil as well as nationalistic juries in the
U.S., might lead to even more harmful consequences. For instance retaliation
measures between countries and further increasing the incentives for particular
countries to become information hells or havens.
It could be argued these practices would constitute discrimination among
nationals and foreigners, which is banned by the principle of national treatment.
However, the efficacy of that norm, in terms of the level of compliance either
voluntarily or mandatory through the TRIPs mechanism of enforcement, might
not be high enough as to make them unrealistic. Let us recall that the TRIPs
imposes rights and obligations on governments and do not confer any right to
private parties. 161Likewise, proving discrimination requires the existence of a
"long practice" not merely an individual, even if widely-evident, case of
discrimination. Moreover, it is not clear what is the threshold for distinguishing
cases where there is discrimination from cases that not. Finally, applying the
standard of discrimination to judicial decision (or those administrative decisions
with similar legal effects) seems to be more difficult than applying it to legislative
acts, i.e. amendments of existing patent laws, or executive decrees and
regulations with general effects in patent matters, i.e. a patent office denying the
patentability of specific subject-matter beyond the minimum standards of
multilateral and bilateral treaties.
A valid shortcut is that a U.S. court waits until the corresponding Brazilian
authority decides the issue of whether the Brazilian patent is valid or not.
However this potential solution still requires the establishment of a compromise
between those countries to regulate such disputes in order to avoid other harmful
strategies such as a Brazilian court delaying its decision or issuing a fast and
biased decision against patent rights owned by foreigners. If such a compromise
can be reached I do not see any reason why a model such as the 2003 Proposal
could not be implemented first.

settled after Brazil initiated consultations arguing that Chapter 18 of US Patent Law violated the
TRIPs.
161 This is a very important difference with bilateral treaties covering intellectual property
rights
that directly give private "investors" cause of actions, which may be adjudicated either by
domestic courts or other adjudicatory bodies such as arbitral agencies, see those treaties cited
supra, note 16.

To conclude, a U.S. court should not assume jurisdiction because that may 162
unexpectedly increase the potential liability of BRACOM whose search costs
to avoid infringement are to be exponentially expanded from its place of
operation if USCOM has multiple patents for a single invention. Moreover, were
this sort of action to be promoted unilaterally by US law the costs of monitoring
foreign activity for private parties would increase without a certain payoff if most
U.S. decisions cannot be enforced abroad.
The result is the same if, besides BRACOM, there were other unrelated potential
defendants in many countries, USCOM would have to sue in each country.
Scenario 2:
The same actors but this time BRACOM has a Brazilian patent for W, which
makes the case more complicate. Now the issue may be the validity of both
Brazilian and US patents for X and W respectively. Were this and the previous
issues easily overcome, then it should be determined whether one patent
infringes the other one assuming they are both valid. Given the lack of last resort
authorities to adjudicate disputes regarding the proper application of validity
standards such as lack of novelty, non-obviousness, non-utility, and even lack of
working requirements in Brazil, the only possible way to consolidate both actions
would be to allocate them in the first seized court, so that a race to a court would
arise from which benefits are, at the very least, doubtful.
Who should prevail? Clearly the current stage of the international patent system
in its procedural and substantive terms does not give us an answer to that, and
this sort of situation is to be endured as accepted costs of the current
international patent system.
Scenario 3:
In this hypothetical scenario, USCOM had gotten patents for X in Brazil and the
US, then it licensed X to BRACOM and the latter decided not to pay royalties any
more after learning how to make X on its own. USCOM sues for breach of the
contract, in which it is usually established either that the parties may choose a
particular forum to litigate or to submit any potential dispute to an arbitrator. Let
us assume the selected exclusive forum is the U.S. and the contract particularly
set out that any potential dispute regarding the validity of X both according to US
or Brazilian law is treated in U.S. courts. 3 Then USCOM files an action for
162

As long as legal standards to determine infringement differ among countries, BRACOM would

find it difficult to assess the probabilities of being infringing domestic patent rights if that issue
could be decided by any foreign court applying domestic substantive patent law.
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Private parties may be able to regulate this issue in the contract taking into account the

different scenarios for attacking the validity of a patent: as a defence to infringement or as a
counterclaim for revocation. Moreover, a model such as the 2003 Proposal will also help to

breaching the contract before a U.S. court and BRACOM raises the invalidity of
Brazilian patent for X as a defense, what might happen then?
A hypothetical decision of the U.S. court regarding the validity of X may lead to
hold that the Brazilian patent for X is valid and that it was infringed by BRACOM,
which in turn may have to be enforced in Brazil due to, for instance, the lack of
assets in the US. Given that Brazil does not have actually any commitment to do
so BRACOM may prefer to start the whole process again in Brazil without even
taking into account the facts and evidence produced in the U.S. trial. This last
solution will increase both judicial and private costs of litigation. The fact that a
potential U.S. judgment may not require its enforcement in Brazil, for example
because BRACOM has assets to be seized in the US, should not be used to hide
the existing tensions to adjudicate disputes involving foreign patents. Otherwise
there would be further incentives for courts and countries to use unilateral
measures to pursue their own best-strategies, which problems were described
above.
Assuming the case is decided according to the 2003 Proposal, the validity of X
seems to be an "incidental question" according to the terms of the 2003
Proposal, so it can be addressed by the selected jurisdiction i.e. a U.S. court, and
the holding enforced by a Brazilian court or agency. If the U.S. court does
exercise jurisdiction over the issue of infringement but does not over the validity
of X, BRACOM should initiate a trial in Brazil as soon as possible to try to stop or
postpone the case in the U.S. If both parallel trials are to continue there will be
more probabilities of ending up with two opposed, and likely irreconcilable,
judgments. 164 If the U.S. court does not exercise jurisdiction over the validity nor
the infringement of the Brazilian patent but still decides to enforce the contract,
there will be unfair and harmful effects for BRACOM, which is likely to be found
liable for breaching a contract with a potential non existing object, even if the
Brazilian patent is "prima facie" invalid.165 This is the reason to prefer treating
both validity and infringement together rather than in different jurisdictions. If the
U.S. court preempts these issues through the jurisdiction granted under state
contract law, there will arise the problems of enforcing the decision if BRACOM
does not have any asset in the U.S. as well as of increasing the probabilities of
retaliation by Brazil.

consolidate those cases with mixed reasons, i.e. validity treated in one country through a
revocation action while there is an infringement action in another state, if those actions are
pursued by private parties having a enforceable contract establishing an exclusive forum.
164 That is the important function of article 7 of the 2003 Proposal requiring any court other than

the chosen court to suspend or dismiss the proceedings with some exceptions.
165 Let us recall that in terms of domestic US law, a licensee is able to oppose the validity
of a
patent to justify its denial to comply with the contract, which seems to be the optimal choice for
balancing the interest of patent holders, potential competitors and consumers.

Overall, all of these options seem to justify the consolidation of all potential
litigation in a single jurisdiction because otherwise both USCOM and BRACOM
cannot easily split or reduce transaction costs through contractual negotiation as
long as any promise made therein can be broken without any costs or any
remedy for the parties. 166 A treaty such as the 2003 Proposal may impose such
obligations on Brazil and the U.S. as well as private parties operating therein,
which may result in decreasing the overall costs of the transaction making all the
parties better off. Hence, enforcing the choice of forum according to the license
seems to be ex ante in the best interest of all the concerned parties giving the
opportunity to both USCOM and BRACOM to internale the benefits and the costs
of operating internationally under the current international patent system.
For example, by designating the U.S. as the selected forum BRACOM may be
bound to not free ride on USCOM's innovative activity because it will be
apprehensive of being held responsible for patent infringement. This in turn may
mean that USCOM faces less cost of monitoring the licensing agreement,
including avoiding litigation costs in Brazil, thus saving resources which may be
split by both parties in the price or costs of the agreement. Due to those facts,
USCOM or any of its competitors will be more interested in transferring
technology to BRACOM who will also gain from the raising number of
competitors of USCOM disclosing more and better information.
Hence, the 2003 proposal should include the enforcement and recognition of
exclusive choice of courts even in cases involving the validity of foreign patent
rights, which is a necessary condition for exercising jurisdiction over other
potential issues such as infringement of patents or breach of contracts indirectly
"regulating" said rights. Moreover, it may be a good idea to establish that any
judgment over validity of foreign patents is to have inter partes effects, not only to
overcome sensitive issues as the sovereignty of the registering state but also to
avoid private parties abusing of such regulation in their own private benefits,
practices that are to be endure as a minimum costs of such an international
system. Establishing such a soft notion of claim preclusion is better than nothing
given the current stage of the international patent system. 16 7 Even with this
limitation, a holding with inter partes effects issued by a competent court may
improve the quality and quantity of information regarding the validity and scope of
protection of patents with important market value, which are the ones finally to be
166

For example a promise by BRACOM not to raise the issue of the validity for Brazilian patent

on X may be declared void by a Brazilian court for "public reasons" prevailing over private parties
will. In this regard it should be considered that many domestic patent laws contain criminal
provisions to deter willful infringement, which may impose problems over an effective use of a
treaty such as the 2003 Proposal, as it excludes criminal matters from its scope.
167 The 2003 Proposal has the benefit of establishing issue preclusion, see
article 9 (2) stating
than any review by the addressed court should not include "the finding facts on which the court of
origin based its jurisdiction".

litigated. Thus, a judgment holding either that patent X is valid or that BRACOM
has not infringed it, may bring relevant information not only to the parties of the
dispute but also to interested third parties. For instance, those who are analyzing
whether to obtain a license for X or to design around it may have more
information before making such choice. This is one of the social benefits of
allowing a competent court to hold that X does not reach BRACOM activity, for
that judgment will provide potential users of X and competitors of USCOM with
useful information.
As it was pointed out above, the current 2003 Proposal does not include validity
of patents as a matter to be enforced and recognized under the terms of a future
treaty, although it seems to contain a gray are in those cases where validity
arises as an incidental question. Given the reason stated above, I consider that
the allocation of jurisdiction in the 2003 Proposal can be extended to include
validity of patent as a matter to be mandatory adjudicated by a selected court
and enforced by an addressed forum but for some exceptions.
Scenario 4:
Here other players enter the game, ARGCOM an Argentinean company and
UKCOM, a British company controlling subsidiaries in other European countries.
All of them are competitors of USCOM who had been granted patents for X in all
those mentioned countries. Then USCOM and UKCOM entered a contract for
technical assistance whereby the former provided the latter the use of X.
ARGCOM has no relation with any of the said companies but is using a similar
product or process to X in Argentina.
This is the sort of scenario where a system such as the 1999 Draft could be very
useful and it may be the kind of scenario emerging from the expansion of
globalization. If a single invention is globally used the chances to free ride also
increase so that it may be desirable to consolidate most of the related actions in
a single forum.
However, taking into account the costs of such system mentioned above, the
2003 Proposal is to be very helpful as a first stage of a more general system to
litigate patents internationally. Under the relatedness rationale, the contract
between USCOM and UKCOM should be consolidated and enforced according
to its terms, and an Argentinean court should decide the potential infringement of
X in Argentina. It is likely that the contract between USCOM and UKCOM
establishes that potential disputes over infringement and validity of the patent for
X are to be exclusively treated either by an arbitror or a particular court. The cited
growing use of the former should guide us to consider that the inclusion of
validity of foreign patent into the 2003 Proposal has proper grounds to be further
analyzed. The fact that there is to be a single dispute regarding the
infringement/validity of X by UKCOM and/or some/all of its subsidiaries, implies
making real most of the benefits cited in Section 3.

All these scenarios show that an agreement such as the 2003 Proposal may
alleviate and reduce inefficiencies in favor of private parties and governments by
avoiding overlapping trials with the inherent waste of private and public
resources. These and the other advantages of international consolidation of
patent disputes pointed out throughout this paper confer the basis to continue
working for making all those theoretical benefits real.
5.2) Applying said rationale to establish a system of international patent
litigation in the short term.
Those scenarios mentioned above might suggest that a multinational system to
allow the free flow of patent judgments is not necessary. However, as domestic
patent laws become more harmonized and international patent disputes arise in
number and importance, the work done by The Hague Conference should be
taken into account by those trying to find solutions for this emerging matter.
In my opinion, any starting point for consolidating multinational patent disputes
should take into account the existence of countries with symmetric and
asymmetric incentives to regulate and thus to adjudicate said disputes. It should
also differentiate between whether an international dispute involves related or
unrelated parties from those countries.
This rationale may allow us to take a first step towards developing and efficient
and fair system of international patent litigation.
Moreover, the inclusion of patents within the 2003 Proposal may have the
advantage of not discriminating among different intellectual property rights to be
included in a B2B transaction capable of being enforced across domestic
borders. 168 This is important for there are many domestic systems with specific
intellectual property rights that formally differ in names but apply to the same
subject matter such as copyright and patents for software with practical

applications. 169
Another consideration regarding the current 2003 text is that some sort of
formality may be desirable. Due to the importance of having a public notice that a
domestic patent right can be enforced in a country other than the registering
state, it seems to be a good idea to require some sort of registration of the
contract within an official agency. Indeed, this formality is currently imposed in
many countries as a requirement for the assignment and/or licensing of a
contract, for the contract to have erga ommnes effects as well as for receiving
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See article 2 (k) excluding all intellectual property right but copyrights and related rights.

169 Article 6 (c) of Argentinean Patent Law No. 24.481, as modified by National Law No. 24.572,

states that software is not patentable while National Law No. 11.723 provides copyright protection
(or more properly authorial rights) for software creations. However, there have been granted
some patents for software when they have concrete practical application.

some tax benefits as in Argentina regarding the use of international treaties to
avoid double imposition of income taxes.
Hence, I think that it is possible to include patent rights in the 2003 Proposal
leaving it up to each country to decide whether to ratify or to observe the treaty
regarding such complex and sensitive issue as international patent litigation. In
doing so and because of the close link between international regulation of
innovation and domestic economic development, this choice is likely to be best
evaluated by LDCs governments having the responsibility of improving the
standards of living of their habitants.
Regarding the core issue of allocating jurisdiction over validity of patents it seems
that allowing a private party to raise the issue as a defense to oppose in an
infringement action of a foreign patent is the best relative solution. Some of the
reasons are the unfair results of denying such a defense to the alleged
wrongdoer if that was agreed on an enforceable contract. Moreover doing
otherwise may damage the dialogue among domestic courts to deal with foreign
infringement of patent rights, which requires acquiring knowledge and workingexpertise of foreign patent laws. This dialogue will become more necessary in the
near future where a system to consolidate patent disputes is likely to be further
demanded.
Implementing a broader system including disputes between related and
unrelated parties such as the 1999 Proposal may be suitable for countries like
the U.S. and the EU, whose relations in economic, political and cultural terms
can be described as symmetric, at least if compared with other countries such as
LDCs.
The chart below summarizes the rationale developed above and its application to
the proposals of the Hague Conference.

FROM SYMMETRIC
COUNTRIES
1999 Draft or 2003 P.
RELATED PARTIES
FROM ASYMMETRIC
COUNTRIES
2003 P.

ALLOCATION
OF JURISDICTION
OVER INFRINGEMENT
AND VALIDITY OF
PATENTS

UNRELATED PARTIES

FROM SYMMETRIC
COUNTRIES
1999 Draft
FROM ASYMMETRIC
COUNTRIES
None

CONCLUSION.
Once the correlation between further harmonization of domestic substantive
patent law and diminishing costs of litigating patent across domestic borders has
been stated, we should agree that the design and implementation of a system to
enforce patents rights across domestic borders has more advantages than
disadvantages as innovative activity expands worldwide. Whether such a system
should be implemented through bilateral instruments or a multinational treaty
should be further analyzed.
However, it is clear that the ongoing works done within the Hague Conference
require lawmakers to take into account the ongoing symmetric and asymmetric
regulatory incentives of potential member countries.
Regarding countries with symmetric incentives, a project establishing the
consolidation of disputes including unrelated parties such as the 1999 Draft could
have more advantages than disadvantages. The main reason is that those
countries are net export of goods to be protected by patents so they may have
similar incentives to substantially regulate their systems in a similar way, i.e.:
high patent protection, which may not increase the social costs faced by potential
competitors already operating within those countries.

Regarding countries with asymmetric incentives such as Latin American
countries and the U.S., a second distinction should be made between allowing
the consolidation of disputes among related and not related parties.
Consolidating disputes among related parties, for example based on a
contractual relation, may have advantages for private parties as well as for
domestic judicial systems of both sorts of countries. However, said consolidation
should not be allowed in relation with unrelated parties as such a model might
increase the costs of potential competitors in the net importer country, so that
such a system may not be the best strategy for these sorts of countries in the
medium and long term.
Because of all the foregoing a multilateral system generally adjudicating global
patent litigation such as the 1999 Draft or some of the options of the 2001
Proposal is not likely to be adopted in the short term. However it is clear that a
model such as the 2003 Proposal may bring potential benefits so that the
inclusion of patents in such a model should still be analyzed within Hague
Conference. Such inclusion may be the starting point of an incremental path of
regulation towards the free flow of patent judgments, which in the future could
surpass current concerns of consolidating patent disputes in a country other than
the registering state to adjudicate both infringement and validity actions to the
benefit of those with legitimate expectations on the matter.

